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LIQUEFIED ENERGY GAS TERMINAL RISK: 
A COWARISON AND EVALUATION 
Christoph Mandl and John Lathrop 
h t e r n a t i o n a l  h s t i t u t e  f o r  Applied S y s t e m s  Analys i s ,  Lazenburg ,  Aus tr ia  
This repor t  has three  m a i n  goals: 
(1) To p r e s e n t  a n d  compare  t he  var ious  r i sk  a s s e s s m e n t  p rocedures  a s  t h e y  
have  b e e n  applied to  l ique f ied  e n e r g y  gas  (LEG) t e r m i n a l  s i t i ng ,  and  in 
so doing to c l a r i f y  the  l i m i t s  of knowledge  a n d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of LEG 
r i s k s .  
(2) To q u a n t i f y  a n d  compare  t he  r i s k s  e s t i m a t e d  in ana ly se s  prepared  f o r  
f o u r  LEG t e r m i n a l  s i t e s ,  n a m e l y  E e m s h a v e n  (Netherlands) ,  
Mossmonan-Braefoot  B a y  ( 1 )  Point  Concept ion  (USA), a n d  
W d h e l m s  h a v e n  (FRG). 
(3) To eva lua t e  t he  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t s  u n d e r t a k e n  f o r  these  f o u r  LEG t e r m i -  
n a l  s i t e s  a n d  t o  sugges t  gu ide l i ne s  o n  the  p repara t ion  of a good LEG r i s k  
a s s e s s m e n t  r epor t .  
1.1 Background. Purpose, and Scope 
In the last decade a new technology for transporting and storing natural 
gas has become increasingly accepted: to reduce the temperature of the gas 
below -162"C, a t  which point i t  becomes a liquid a t  a six-hundredth of its 
former volume. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) can then be transported by sea 
from Indonesia, Algeria, and elsewhere to the major markets in the US and 
Europe a t  reasonable cost. The LNG can then be stored efficiently in tanks due 
to its high energy per unit  volume. 
However, due to the  extremely low tenlperatures required, ~ p e c i a l  ships, 
t ransfer  terminals,  and storage tanks on land a rc  required, 2\11 01 wliir-h a r c  
costly, and so are  necessarily of considerable size. A typical ~,c.<sel ca;i cor-I- 
tain 125 000 m3 of LEG, and a transfer terminal up t.o 60 OOD 1 1 1 ~  01 gi1a per dhy 
(equivalent to a n  energy flow of approximately 15 000 hl\V - the  pot \er  (I! : ibou l  
15 standard nuclear power plants), and storage tanks a re  planned to  c o n l a ~ n  
up to  500 000 m3. It is therefore not surprising t h a t  such a high concenlra- 
tion of LEG in one place has created concern over the  potential negative 
effects,  particularly to the environment and to the  local population. 
This report  covers a broader category of terminals than those handling 
just LNG: one terminal (Mossmorran) is to handle liquefied propane and 
butane.  While LNG is stored a t  -163°C a t  very low pressure over a ~ n b i ~ n t ,  
liquefied propane and butane are  stored a t  much  higher temperatures  and 
pressures,  and thus  behave significantly differently when spilled. All t h r e e  
substances involve essentially the  same accident scenarios,  although with 
different parameters  and probabilities of detonation, so tha t  propane and 
butane have many of t h e  same risk assessment features and problems a s  
LNG. Since all of these  substances a r e  called liquefied energy gases (LEG), 
the  terminals  examined in this study will be referred to  as LEG terminals.  
Many factors are  involved in assessing t h e  advantages and disadvantages 
of an LEG terminal  a t  a specific site,  bu t  the  risk to  the  local population is t h e  
most  crucial  question. Because of a lack of historical dat.a on accidents a t  
LEG terminals ,  however, the  frequency of such events and their consequences 
cannot be readily estimated. Therefore, over t h e  past few years a t t empts  
have been made to quantify the  local population risk a t  several planned LEG 
terminals,  using various techniques and models, with different results.  
This report  reviews the  risk assessments undertaken for LEG terminals 
in four countries,  discusses their  plausibilities, explains their differences, 
and compares their  risk estimates.  Where necessary and appropriate, we 
describe some of t h e  reports in detail. Because LEG terminal  risk assessment  
is a relatively new technique, there  is still disagreement among experts con- 
cerning how to  quantify risk, which models to use,  what factors t o  include, 
and what to  exclude. A major par t  of this report  theretore evaluates t h e  LEG 
terminal  risk assessments and suggests guidelines for evaluating risk assess- 
ments  in general.  
This report  has th.ree main goals: 
(1) To present  and compare the  various risk assessment procedures as they 
have been applied to LEG terminal siting, and in dolng so to clarify t h e  
l imits of knowledge and understanding of LEG risks. 
(2) To quantify and compare t h e  risks a t  Eemshaven, Mossmorran-brae foot 
Bay, Point Conception, and Wiltielmshaven 
(3) To suggest guidelines with which to evaluate LEG terminal  risk assess- 
m e n t  reports,  particularly those for the  four terminal  sites. 
Clearly, no pretense is made t h a t  th is  report  provides complete or final 
answers concerning comparative risks or risk assessments;  r a ther ,  it 
describes some initial  attempt.^ to address important  problems in t h e  field of 
risk assessrner~ t .  
1.2 Risk, Probabililiex, and Conseql~ences  
Before i t  i s  possible to quant.ify risk, we m u s t  define i t .  People mean  
different things when they talk about risk; therefore our  definition (actually 
a se t  of definitions) canno t  be descriptive, but  r a lhe r  will be prescriptive. 
I t  should be  admit ted a t  the  outset  t h a t  risk is  a difficult concept to 
evaluate. Ideally, i f  one adopts the axioms of rational choice under uncer- 
tainty,  the  evaluation of any decision alternalive should consider the  proba- 
bility distribulion of the  consequences of tha t  alternative,  and this may be 
expressed in several ways (see e.g. ,  Luce and Raiffa 1957). Yet t h e  concept  of 
risk singles ou t  a subset  of those consequences for special analysis. The t e r m  
is typically applied to  specific uncertain costs,  diverting a t tent ion from other  
costs and uncer ta in  benefits tha t  could be just as  important  in the  evalua- 
tion. In t h e  case  of LEG, for example, several  dimensions are  of concern in 
si te selection and facility design, such as land use,  environmental q u a l ~ t y ,  a i r  
quality benefits of LEG, and dependence on ioreign supplies. Some of these  
involve uncer ta in  costs,  such as  financial losses to the  developer if anything 
goes wrong (delay in application approval, loss of supply contract ,  vessel 
accident); environmental effects due to  accidents or even routine disruption; 
fatalities and injuries due to  accidents;  property losses due to accidents;  and 
losses to consumers  due to  supply in terrupt ion (e.g., unemployment and  
health effects). These uncertain costs  could be and a r e  referred to as  risks, 
and they can  all be analyzed using risk assessment  techniques.  However, in 
all t h e  reports reviewed here ,  the  t e r m  risk assessment  in  t h e  context of L,EG 
typically refers only to es t imates  of fatalities caused by accidents.  
One could argue t h a t  such  a narrow scope reflects a judgment t h a t  
externali t ies involving fatalities deserve special a t tent ion.  However, o ther  
effects of LEG coulti cause  loss of lives, such  a s  supply interruption in  a 
severe winter. This narrow scope given to risk assessments is an implicit ack- 
nowledgment t h a t  special attention should be given to assessing t h e  probabil- 
ity of accidental a n d / o r  catastrophic loss of life. We call th is  particular focus 
the  political perspective of risk, in reference t o  the fact t h a t  reali t ies of the  
political process of risk management  include a special sensitivity to t h a t  
form of loss of life. I t  follows tha t  t h e  definition of risk adopted he re  should 
be compatible with t h a t  focus of attention. 
There is an  extensive l i terature t h a t  deals with the  political perspective 
of risk (see,  e .g . ,  Slovic e t  al. 1980), which identifies particular important  
dimensions of risk from t h a t  perspective. In addition to the  possibility of 
catast.rophe itself, the  inequity 01 t h e  burden of risk is important ,  as  is 
whether. or not risk is occupational, and how the  risk to a n  individual com- 
pares with o the r  risks commonly experienced. It is  beyond the  scope of th is  
report  to  develop a single comprehensive measure  01 t h e  political perspective 
of risk,  but ,  in choosing a definition we should be responsive to t h a t  perspec- 
tive and select ones t h a t  include these concerns.  
The best way to develop a definition of risk is to s ta r t  by quoting some 
definitions from the risk assessment. l i terature.  
"Risk is the  expected riumber of fatalities per year resulting from t h e  
consequenccs of an accidents! event." (SAI 1976) 
"Risk is the  probability of an  injurious or  destructive event, generated by 
a hazard, over a specified period of time." (Cremer and Warner 1977) 
Group risk is defined as  "the frequency a t  which certain numbers  of 
acute  fatalities are  expected from a single accident." The risk to t h e  
society as a whole is defined as  "the expected total numbers of acu te  
fatalities per year resulting from accidental events in the  system." (Bat- 
telle 1978) 
"Societal risk - total expected fatalities per year; individual risk - pro- 
bability of an  exposed individual becoming a fatality per year; group risk 
- probability of an individual in a specific exposed group becoming a 
fatality per year; risk of multiple fatalities - probability of exceeding 
specific numbers of fatalities pe r  year." (Keeney e t  al. 1979) 
I t  is of in teres t  to note t h a t  these  definitions of risk are the  only ones used in 
t h e  risk assessments reviewed. In all other reports not mentioned above, t h e  
risk is assessed without ever being explicitly defined. In addition, in  SAI 
(1975) other  summary measures  a re  given, including t h e  risk of multiple 
fatalities, which are  not included in the  quoted definition. The general 
assumption of most of the  reports seems to  be t h a t  risk is a multidimensional 
concept t h a t  can be adequately described to  a decision maker by various se t s  
of numbers ,  without an explicit definition. 
Although the  quoted definitions differ quite substantially, in most  cases 
they agree a t  leas t  to the  ex ten t  t h a t  risk is related to the probabilities of 
certain events and their  consequences (in t e rms  of number  of fatalities). One 
can identify two polar definitions of risk. One extreme definition (Cremer a n d  
Warner) considers only t h e  probabilities of destructive events and does no t  
look a t  the  consequences. Such an  approach is only practical as  a rionevalua- 
tive description of risk, and only makes sense for comparison or  evaluation in 
t h e  very limited case when all destructive events have equal consequences, 
and risk is defined as t h e  probability t h a t  any one of the  events would occur 
in a given t ime  interval. It would be clearly meaningless to label two facilities 
equally risky if they had equal probabilities of a n  accident, but  if an accident 
in one facility would have much  more serious consequences than one in t h e  
other.  On the other  extreme,  risk can be and is sometimes viewed a s  the  
worst possible event  with t h e  mos t  serious consequences. Again we would 
argue tha t  focusing on this kind of risk is not meaningful because it omits 
the  probability of an event. 
The underlying concept of this report  is based on the  axioms of rational 
choice under  uncertainty,  i .e . ,  tha t  ally evaluation of t h e  risk of a decision 
alternative should depend upon t h e  probability distribution of the  conse- 
quences of choosing t h a t  alternative.  While descriptions of political behavior 
may deviate in important  ways from the rational choice paradigm, this report  
adopts a n  essentially prescriptive perspective, while remaining sensitive to  
the  political perspective of risk.  We do this by adopting definitions of risk 
t h a t  address political perspective concerns,  as described by Keeney e t  al. 
(1979): 
(i) Risk of m u l t i p l e  f a t a l i t i e s .  the probability of exceeding specific numbers  
of fatalities per  year. 
(ii) Societal  r i s k :  total expected fatalities per  year.  
(iii) C r o u p  r i s k ;  the  probability of an individual in a specific exposed group 
becoming a fatality per  year. 
(iv) Ind iv idual  r i s k :  the  probability of an  exposed individual becoming a 
fatality per year. 
Each of these  definitions addresses a different aspect of the political per- 
spective of risk, although they a re  interrelated (see Section 3.5.1). They can 
all be derived from the  same basic se t  of data:  the  annual probability distri- 
bution of accidents and the conditional probability t h a t  an exposed individual 
will be killed in an accident. In practice,  t h a t  data  se t  typically takes the  
form of conditional probabilities t h a t  particular geographic regions a re  
exposed t o  various physical effects, combined with population density data  for 
each region. The data can be used to  calculate the  probability distribution of 
the  number  of fatalities, which in turn yields the  risk of multiple fatalities 
and t h e  societal risk. The same data can be used t o  calculate the  annual pro- 
bability tha t  a n  exposed individual will become a fatality. The s u m  of those 
probabilities is t h e  societal risk; the  average over all exposed individuals is 
the  individual risk; and the  average over each  group of individuals, classified 
by location or occupation (e.g., LEG terminal employees), is the  group risk. 
Two important  aspects of accident risk, injuries and property damage, 
a re  not considered separately here  because LEG-related accidents are charac- 
terized by closely interrelated fatalities, injuries, and property damage. Risk 
measures  based on fatalities can be taken a s  good relative indicators of all 
three  types of risk,  so long as alternatives to LEG have similar ratios between 
fatalities, injuries, and property damage. We a r e  not  saying t h a t  this condi- 
tion holds for t h e  LEG terminals studied here;  the  information available to us 
is not adequate to  t es t  t h e  validity of such an  assumption. 
The definition of risk adopted here  is by no means an  ideal or universal 
one. Readers from particular disciplines may have other definitions t h a t  they 
find more suitable for their purposes. However, our definition requires esti- 
mates  of the  probability of an event,  and its consequences, both of which are  
discussed in this report .  Most readers will be concerned with one or both of 
these topics, and so will find tht: report  relevant to assessments of risk as  tie 
or  she defines i t .  
1.3 LEG Risk Assessments a s  Decision Aids 
I t  is easy t o  forget t h a t  a risk assessment is  no t  an end unto itself, bu t  is 
only one element  in t h e  complex process of facility siting and design. More 
importantly,  a risk assessment  should be a n  aid for one or more of t h e  deci- 
sions t h a t  m u s t  be made  within t h a t  process. A knowledge of where risk 
assessments fit within a n  LEG siting and design procedure is essential to the  
understanding of the i r  adequacy a n d  usefulness in t h e  decision process. This 
procedure is p a r t  of  a h ierarchy of dec:isions: should I,EG be irnporLed t o  
expand the  national  energy s u p p l ] ~  and, if so,  Llow m u c h ?  'i'tlc, sourcc?s o! 
na tu ra l  gas m u s t  be then identified: darnestic,  foreign via pipeline, or foreign 
via LEG. If i t  i s  decided that  a new LEG te rmina l  s h o l ~ l d  be buil t ,  then t h e  s i t e  
m u s t  be se lec ted ,  and  a detailed design of t h e  facility developed. 
There a r e  two fea tures  of such  a h ierarchy of no te  he re .  First ,  popula- 
tion risk is only one dimension of concern;  o the r s  include cost ,  land use,  
environmental  quality, dependence on foreign supplies,  a s  well as the  r isk of 
supply in ter rupt ion due  t o  shor tage ,  embargo,  accidenl ,  ear thquake,  or  bad 
weather  preventing berthing.  
The second notable f ea tu re  of t h e  decision hierarchy is t h e  interdepen- 
dence of t h e  decisions. While t h e  top-down order  presented above m a y  
approximate typical chronological order ,  in fact  each decision depends on t h e  
outcome of t h e  previous one.  For example ,  t h e  decision t o  se lec t  LEG as  a 
new source  of energy depends on cos t  a n d  risk figures t h a t  a r e  depentleiit on 
t h e  s i te  a n d  design. In fac t ,  if i t  were no t  for t h a t  in terdependence,  t h e  f irst  
t h r e e  decisions would not  be re levant  t o  th i s  report .  It follows t h a t  t h e  deci- 
sions a r e  made in a n  involved order ,  a s  tenta t ive  decisions based on uncer-  
ta in  e s t ima tes  filter down t h e  h ierarchy a n d  feedback filters back up. 
Given t h e  n u m b e r  of decisions involving risk t h a t  m u s t  be made ,  i t  would 
seem t h a t  t h e r e  a re  several  roles for r isk a s sessmen t  in LEG facility siting 
and design. Yet mos t  of t h e  processes studied narrowed t h a t  role down t o  a 
single application: on one dimension,  risk to life; a n d  a t  one level, siting o r  
design (depending on t h e  country) .  There a r e  several  effects of this  narrow- 
ing. To begin with, i t  diverts  analytical  effort a n d  political a t tent ion away 
f rom those  questions not  addressed by a risk a s sessmen t ;  for example,  supply 
in ter rupt ion risk could be a significant fac tor .  In t h e  case  of California, sup- 
ply in ter rupt ion risk (due  to shortage) was t h e  chief a r g u m e n t  for init iat ing 
t h e  LEG application in t h e  first place,  a n d  so  was a n  impor tan t  consideration.  
A second effect of t h e  narrow role given t o  risk assessment  is t h a t  t h e  
level a t  which i t  is applied affects how i t  i s  conducted.  When a risk assess- 
m e n t  is pa r t  of t h e  s i te  selection process,  a s  in California, a par t icular  facility 
design is  a s sumed ,  and  analytical  effort concen t ra t e s  on such  aspects a s  ship- 
ping traffic a n d  local  population density a s  site-specific inpu t s  in t h e  calcula- 
tion of populat.ion risk. When a risk a s sessmen t  is p a r t  of the  facility design 
process,  t h e  s i te  h a s  already been selected,  and  t h e  analysis considers t h e  
sizes,  a r r angement ,  and  specifications of components  of t h e  facility. In t h a t  
case technical  design variat ions a r e  considered in t e r m s  of incrementa l  r isk 
reductions.  
There i s  a third effect of t h e  narrow role given t o  risk assessment  t h a t  is 
more  subtle t h a n  those given above, b u t  is perhaps  t h e  mos t  impor tan t  one.  
Once a si te is se lec ted ,  given t h e  political reali t ies of t h e  si tuation,  t h e  ques- 
tion of t h e  overall acceptabil i ty of t h e  risk i s  m o r e  or  less  se t t led .  If a r isk 
assessment  i s  applied a t  t h e  design level, i t  m a y  consider various 
modifications t o  r educe  t h e  r i sk  in  t h e  mos t  cost-effective way. However, 
given i t s  scope a n d  cha r t e r ,  t h e  a s sessmen t  is highly unlikely t o  find t h a t  a 
s i te  canno t  be  m a d e  acceptably safe with c u r r e n t  technology and  so  should be  
abandoned. On t h e  o the r  hand,  if a r i sk  a s sessmen t  i s  applied a t  t he  s i te  
selection level, it would at least be feasible to rule that  none of the sites in 
the current  choice set are acceptable. That feasibility arises from the lack of 
political and economic momentum behind any one site, and from the fact 
that a t  least in some cases additional sites could be considered in response to 
analysis results. 
Risk assessment does not exist in a vacuum. It is a decision aid within a 
much larger process. Any understanding of current methods of assessment, 
and any suggestions for improvement, also require an understanding of that  
larger process controlling the role and nature of risk assessment in very 
basic and important ways. 
2 REVEX OF THE LITERATURE 
Before going into quantitative and technical detail, we compare and 
evaluate in qualitative terms the risk assessments prepared for Eemshaven, 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay, Point Conception, and Wilhelmshaven, with some 
reference to reports on other sites. We also discuss critical reviews of risk 
assessments and present their major points of criticism. 
2.1 Risk Assessment Reports  
In Table 1 we give a comprehensive overview of the most important risk 
assessment reports available to us. Before discussing various aspects of this 
table, some comments on the headings might be helpful. 
(a) Parts  of the system considered. Not all reports consider all the com- 
ponents of an LEG terminal system, namely vessel, transfer system, and 
storage tanks. In particular, for Wilhelmshaven there are two reports; 
one deals only with vessel operation and LNG transfer, and the other 
deals only with the storage tanks ( the latter report cannot be com- 
mented on here because it was not available to the authors a t  the time 
of writing). 
(b) Concept of risk. As discussed in Section 1.2 there is no unique definition 
of risk. We have indicated the type of risk analyzed in each report. 
(c) Estimation of probabilities of events. One crucial part of risk assess- 
ment  is the estimation of probabilities, unless only the consequences are 
considered. It is therefore necessary to see how this problem has been 
solved in different reports. Two methods can be used. B e n t  tree analysis 
can identify a logical sequence of events (failures) that  could result in 
unwanted consequences (accidents). Having identified the possible 
events, faul t  tree analysis helps to  identify and determine the probabil- 
ity of a "top-level event" (typically a specific accident) that  is the result 
of a sequence of events (failures). Fault t ree analysis evolved in the 
aerospace industry in the early 1960s and has since become a standard 
TABLE I Comparison of risk assessment reports. 
Issues 
considered 
(b) Concept of  risk 
Estimation of: 
(e l )  probabilities 
of  events 
(c2) event tree 
analysis used 
(c3) fault tree 
analysis used 
(d) Estimation of 
consequences 
of events 
(e) Estimation 
of risk 
(g) Uncertainties 
in final findings 
(h) Single event 
with highest risk 
1 TNO 
Vessel, transfer, 
storage tank 
Risk of multiple 
fatalities and group 
risk 
Yes, quantitative 
Yes 
Yes, quantitative 
in terms of 
fatalities 
Societal & individual 
risk low cf. other 
man-made risks 
Societal & individual 
risk low cf. other 
man-made risks 
Not mentioned 
Grounding of LNG 
tankers 
Aberdour Cremer and Warner ADL FERC S A1 
Vessel Vessel, transfer, Vessel, transfer, Vessel Vessel, transfer, 
storage tank storage tank storage tank 
Croup and Probability of an inju- Multiple fatalities Societal, group, and Risk of multiple 
individual risk rious or destructive risk individual risk fatalities, group 
event & individual risk 
Yes, quantitative Only in terms of low, Yes, quantitative Yes, quantitative Yes, quantitative 
very low, etc. 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
No No Yes No Yes 
Yes, quantitative Yes, but only physical Yes, quantitative Yes, quantitative Yes, quantitative 
in terms of cons. (eg, spill size); no  in terms of in terms of in terms of 
fatalities estimation of fatalities fatalities fatalities fatalities 
Individual risk high No estimation of ex- Yes, quantitative Yes, quantitative Yes, quantitative 
cf. other man-made pressed fatalities; only 
risks of probabilities of events 
Individual risk high "No reason t o  doubt that Point Conception Risk comparable to  "The risk is ex- 
cf. other man-made installations cannot be suitable with re- risks from natural tremely low" 
risks built and operated in spect to  vessel events & thus on an 
such a manner as to be traffic safety. Risk acceptable level 
acceptable in terms of is very low. 
community safety" 
Not mentioned Not mentioned Sensitivity analysis Disagreement between Sensitivity 
experts is mentioned analysis 
Not identified Not identified Not identified Not identified Not identified 
TABLE 1 (continued). 
Issues Brotz Krappinger WSD HSE Battelle Keeney et ab SES 
Transfer, 
storage tank 
Vessel 
Not defined 
Vessel Vessel, transfer. 
storage tank 
Vessel, transfer, 
storage tank 
Vessel, transfer, 
storage tank 
Vessel, transfer, 
storage tank 
Not defmed Not defined Multiple fatalities, 
societal, and group 
risk 
Multiple fatality and 
group risk 
Multiple fatality, 
societal, group and 
individual risk 
Multiple fatality 
risk 
Only in terms 
of very low 
No 
No 
Yes, quantitative Only in terms of 
very low 
No 
No 
Yes, quantitative Yes, quantitative Yes, quantitative Yes, quantitative 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes, but only phys- 
ical cons. (eg, spill 
size); no estimation 
of fatalities 
No estimation 
given 
Some quantitative 
statements in terms 
of few and many 
fatalities 
Yes, quantitative 
in terms of fatalities 
Yes, quantitative 
in terms of fatalities 
Yes, quantitative 
in terms of fatalities 
Yes, quantitative 
in terms of 
fatalities 
No estimation 
given 
No estimation 
given 
Yes, quantitative Yes, quantitative Yes, quantitative Yes, quantitative Yes, quantitative 
No final findings With regard to  con- 
sequences & their 
probablity there 
is no danger, cf. 
relevant laws 
Risk is not 
insignificant 
Risk about the same 
as that from the gas 
distribution network 
Risk only acceptable 
if suggested mitigating 
measures are under- 
taken 
Risk less than those 
that the population 
near terminal is 
exposed presently 
Level of safety 
cannot be spe- 
cified accurately 
Not mentioned Not mentioned Mentioned Considered, & error 
bounds given 
Not mentioned Sensitivty analysis 
conducted to examine 
effects of variations 
of 2 parameters 
Considered, & 
error bounds 
given 
Not identified Not identified Not identified Rupture of transfer 
pipeline with delayed 
ignition 
Not identified Not identified Not identified 
technique for systems safety analysis. It was also used in the Rasmussen 
Report ( N H C  1975). 
(d) Estimo.tion of consequences of e7;ents. The consequences of an event 
should be staied in terms a decision maker is concerned with. For this 
reason, and. because of the definitions of risk typically assumed, many 
reports estimate consequences only in t e rms  of the potential number of 
fatalities a certain event could cause. However, other reports estimate 
ony the physical consequences (e .g . ,  the  size of an LEG spill or the size 
of a vapor cloud), without relating them to the possible fatalities. 
(e) Estimation of risk. Different estimates of t he  risk a re  given, depending 
on the definition of risk employed; in some cases no estimate is given a t  
all. 
Cf) End findings. As we see i t ,  the ideal result  of a risk assessment report 
is the quantification of the risk (in his case, from LEG) and i ts  com- 
parison with risks from other sources. The ideal, and thus most useful, 
comparison is between risks from alternatives actually faced in the  
decision-making process: site A versus site B ,  site A versus no site,  etc.  
However, decisions concerning the  acceptability of the risks from LEG 
may involve social value trade-offs and perhaps political considerations 
tha t  go beyond the scope of the risk assessment and the legitimate 
authority of technical risk analysts. It follows tha t  the  final findings of a 
risk assessment should impart information to enable the decision maker 
to  use them as a basis for a decision, without tha t  decision actually 
being made for him. If a risk assessment s ta tes  tha t  a risk is acceptable, 
then the  analysts have made a judgment tha t  they do not have legiti- 
mate  authority to make, a t  least  in the political systems under study 
here .  
( g )  Uncertainties i n  final findings. Due to  the limited data from LEG 
accidents there remains substantial uncertainty about the accuracy of 
the estimates of probabilities and consequences of events. The reports 
handle this problem in various ways: some ignore uncertainties com- 
pletely, some give conservative estimates,  some perform sensitivity 
analysis and some give error bounds on the quantified risk. 
(h) Sng l e  event with highest risk. If mitigating measures  to  reduce risk are  
to  be undertaken i t  is necessary t o  know which event preseilts t he  
highest risk, since i t  is often the case tha t  the highest-risk event offers 
the most  cost-effective opportunities for mitigation. 
When comparing risk asessments,  however, one should keep in mind tha t  
their  variations can a t  least partially be explained by lhe fact tha t  they were 
prepared and used a s  inputs t o  particular decision processes and therefore 
each one was developed in a way suited to  the  particular process i t  was t o  
serve. 
The studies that  a re  essentially different from all t h e  others  in Table 1 
are  Cremer and Warner (1977), Brotz (1978), Krappinger (1978 a,b),  and WSD 
(1978), particularly in t e rms  of the concepts of risk, estimates of conse- 
quences, estimates of risk, and final findings. This may be due to the  
different scientific backgrounds and standards of Lhe arialysts, limited 
resources with which to conduct the  analyses, differences in the decision 
processes a t  Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay and Wilhelmshaven compared with 
those a t  the  other  sites, or some other reason, bu t  we do not  consider these 
lour to  be good examples of LEG risk assessments on t he  basis of the  criteria 
adopted in this study. 
2.2 Risk Assessment Reviews 
A few publications have already addressed t h e  question of the  validity of 
risk assessment methods. The first major report,  often referred to as the 
Lewis Report (1978), was not concerned with LEG, however, but  with the  
Rasmussen Report on nuclear reactor safety (NRC 1975). The first significant 
paper specifically reviewing LEG risk assessments was by Fairley (1977), which 
concerned probability estimates for catastrophic LNG vessel accidents. 
Schneider (1978) dealt  in great detail with specific questions of safety, spill 
dispersion, and vapor cloud deflagration and detonation. The most recent and 
most comprehensive review of LNG risk assessments was undertaken by the 
National Materials Advisory Board of the US Department of Transportation 
(NMAB 1980). In this section we concentrate on this report because it covers 
our  main points of criticism of the  other reports and raises additional ques- 
tions. The main findings of the  NMAR report can be summarized as follows. 
(a) Many reports seem to focus almost exclusively on low-probability, high- 
consequence eve:nts, and thus  tend t o  underestimate the  overall level of 
risk. 
( b )  Many studies do not  consider future pat terns  of LNG tanker traffic move- 
ments  (i.e., projected ship sizes and traffic density). Estimates of proba- 
bilities of LNG vessel accidents in t he  vicinity of terminals should take 
into account t he  expected changes in traffic patterns over the lifetime of 
the  terminal.  
(c) Risk-reduction factors are often given too m.uch credit ,  and estimates of 
their  effectiveness may be arbitrary. Also, these factors are  often 
presented as if they are independent of one another,  with the  effects of 
several risk-reduction factors multiplied to give an overall reduction in 
t he  accident probability. Such assumptions a re  not  usually adequately 
justified. 
( d )  Human error  is not usually taken into account, and when it is, such 
events a re  usually treated as if they a re  independent, while experience 
shows t ha t  they a r e  not. 
( e )  Confidence limits or error  bounds for the probability of LNG spills a re  
rarely given. 
(J) Differences in the models for predicting LNG vapor cloud sizes lead to  
large variations in estimates of the consequences. 
(g) The reports rarely discuss uncertainties in the data or the results; 
instead, some elements in the analyses are presented as facts so tha t  
greater accuracy in the results may be implied than is warranted by t he  
current  state of knowledge. 
(h) In many reports LNG terminal risks are compared with other risks, such 
as driving and natural hazards, to help to give a feel for the magnitude of 
the  estimate. But such comparisons do not and should not imply tha t  
the  risks from LNG are acceptable. 
(i) Whatever flaws LNG risk assessments may have, they are  clearly superior 
to  less systematic methods of identifying possible system weaknesses, 
likely failure modes, and informing decision makers on the topic of risk, 
which is certainly an important aspect of the whole decision problem. 
These nine points can also be taken as a brief introduction to the  kind of 
questions to be discussed here. Although all of these points are  certainly 
very important we feel tha t  some should be looked a t  in greater detail, which 
we do in Section 3, and tha t  some additional points should be raised. Taking 
all factors into account, some general guidelines are  then given on how to  
produce a good risk assessment. The latter two topics a re  addressed in Sec- 
tions 4 and 5. 
3 ASSESmNT AND COMPARISON OF LEG TEHMINAL FUSK 
In this section we discuss the probabilities and consequences of different 
events (failures), following the reports by SAI (1976) and Battelle (1978). After 
a technical description of the four LEG terminals we divide the  rest  of this 
section into three parts. First we consider the estimation of probabilities of 
events, then  estimates of spill sizes, speed, and vapor cloud dispersion as a 
result  of failures, and finally we consider the consequences to the  local popu- 
lation by quantifying the overall risk as a result of first two parts,  population 
density, and a few other factors. We compare the results given in the risk 
assessment reports and discuss their differences in te rms  of the underlying 
assumptions of the models used and their plausibility. 
However, as we showed in Section 2.1, not all reports a re  easily compar- 
able, since some do not consider all the events we discuss. Additionally, other  
reports do not quantify either the probabilities o r  t he  consequences of 
events. This section therefore cannot provide a complete comparison of all 
events; ra ther ,  we want to give some insight into the risk a t  all the terminals, 
to  show how one should go about preparing a risk assessment, and to identify 
t he  open questions in this context. 
3.1 Description of the LEG Terminal Systems 
In Table 2 we give a brief description of the planned terminals a t  
Eemshaven, Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay, Point Conception, and 
Wilhelmshaven. Mossmorran is different from the other terminals in that  not 
only is i t  an export terminal, but the exported gases are LPG (liquefied 
petroleum gases - mainly propane and butane), while LNG consists mostly 
(approximately 90%) of methane. As far as one can tell from the available 
risk studies, the layouts of the four terminals, the LEG tankers (except in 
size), the storage tanks, and the transfer systems are very much the same. 
On a relative scale one would expect that risk will increase with the size 
of the terminal, and also with the number of people living (or working) within 
a certain distance. As far as size is concerned, the Point Conception and 
Wilhelmshaven terminals are larger than the other two, and Wilhelmshaven 
has the largest total storage capacity, although Eemshaven has the largest 
individual tanks. Population density is particularly low at  Point Conception. 
For all sites except Point Conception the LEG tankers have to travel 
through busy shipping channels close to populated areas. The tanker route to 
Eemshaven, for example, is only 1.5 km away from the island of Borkum, and 
tankers en route to Wilhelmshaven pass within 3.5 km of the town of 
Wangerooge. As shown in Table 2, gases handled at  Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay 
are different from those handled a t  the three other terminals, so the conse- 
quences of accidents will differ, even for the same spill sizes. Some proper- 
ties of these gases are listed in Table 3. A t  first, Point Conception appears to 
be the least risky terminal site because of low population density, but this 
might be offset by the fact that  the terminal will handle the largest amount 
of gas. The Wilhelmshaven terminal, which is comparable to Point Concep- 
tion, presents a higher risk because of its higher population density, but the 
extent of the difference can only be quantified through detailed analysis. 
3.2 Events: Probabilities of LEG Spius 
One of the most difficult questions in assessing risk is the identification 
of possible events (failures) and the estimation of their frequencies or proba- 
bilities. By definition i t  is nearly impossible to get enough historical data to 
estimate the probability of a low-probability event. Rather, one has to build 
models and rely on data from other, presumably similar, systems. Another 
difficulty is the  identification of events that  have never occurred tha t  could 
have serious consequences; i t  is certainly impossible to conceive of all possi- 
ble events, as one can easily demonstrate when looking a t  the introduction of 
new technologies, such as airplanes. This problem was acknowledged in the 
Lewis Report on nuclear safety (NKC 1978): 
It is  conceptually impossible to be complete in a mathematical sense in 
the construction of event-trees and fault-trees; what matters is the 
approach to completeness and the ability to demonstrate wilh reasonable 
assurance that  only small contributions are omitted. This inherent limi- 
tation means that any calculation using this methodology is always s u b  
ject to  revision and to doubt as to its completeness. 
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TABLE 3 Some properties of liquefied energy gases. 
Methane 
-- 
-163 
Ethane 
-88 
Propane Butane 
-42 - 1 Boiling point (OC) 
Specific gravity at  
a t  boiling point 
Vapor density a t  0" 
(air= 1) 
Auto-ignition 
temperature ("C) 
Flammable limits 
(concentration in air) 
Gas-to-liquid volume 
ratio (gas a t  On, liquid 
a t  boiling point) 
Energy content  of 1 m3 
liquid a t  boiling point 
We therefore do not and cannot claim that the events considered here are a 
complete set of all possibie events. However, this set includes all events that  
were accounted for in the risk assessment li terature, e.g., TNO (1978), SAI 
(1976), ADL (1978), and Battelle (1978). We subdivide events into three 
groups: vessel accidents, transfer system failures, and events leading to 
storage tank ruptures. 
3.2.1 Vessel accidents 
Basically, two types of model are used to estimate accident probabilities, 
as  described by Philipson (1978). First, one must  differentiate between the 
probability of an accident, and the probability of an LEG spill once an 
accident has occurred. To establish probability estimates of accidents two 
methods a re  used in. the literature: 
Statistical inference. Estimates are computed using historical data, 
first for a particular class of ships, such as oil tankers, and then the esti- 
mates are modified to account for the  anticipated differences in LEG 
tankers and their operations a t  a specific harbor. This is done, for exam- 
ple, by employing judgment and by assessing the proportion of past 
accidents that  would not have occurred if various mitigating measures 
had been taken. Examples of this type of analysis are  given in Ligthart 
(1980) and FERC (1978). 
(ii) Kinematic modeling. In SAl (1976) ship collisions are analyzed by 
assuming ship motions to be random in a zone of interest in the short 
interval of time preceding an accident. A kinematic model provides the 
expected number of collisions per year for a harbor with specific 
TABLE 4 Estimates of the probabilities of various events. 
TNO Aberdour ADL FERC S A1 Brotz Krappinper 
(1) Probability of collision that 2.8 X lo-' 
could lead to a spill per ship 
approaching the LEG terminal 
(2) Probability of grounding that 2.5X lo4 1.5X lo-' 
could lead to a spill per ship includes 
approaching the LEG terminal ( 2 )  and (3) 
(3) Probability of ramming that - 
could lead to a spill per ship 
approaching the LEG terminal 
(4) Probability of missile or airplane - 
crash causing one spill per year 
(5) Probability per year of a mete- - 
orite falling on a specific area 
of 1 m' 
See (1 4) 
- 
(6) Probability of internal system - 3.2 X lo-' - 1.0 X lo-" - - 
failure 
(7) Number of ships per year 54 80 190 190 190 432 432 
(8) Maximum deck size of ship (m') 12 000 6600 12 000 12 000 12000 12 000 12000 
(9) Length of stay of loaded ship in - - 
the vicinity of the terminal (years) 
(10) Maximum size of one tank (m3) 25 000 12000 25 000 25 000 25 000 25 000 25 000 
I I I I I  
I I I I I  
X X X  
t r u "  
0 0 - m a  
configurations and traffic characteristics.  A calibration to the  actual 
average conditions of a number  of harbors is then  made by scaling the  
model t o  fit actual past collision frequencies. 
In a similar manner  the  probability of a spill following an  accident is 
e i ther  estimated from data  from other,  but  similar tankers or computed 
using a model by taking the  physical characteristics of the  ship arid the  tanks 
into consideration. Considering specifically the  statist ical approach, the  esti- 
mates  are  criticized by Fairley (1979), who claims t h a t  due to remaining 
uncertainties the  actual probability may be substantially higher. The types 
of accidents estimated by the  above methods are  collisions, grounding, and 
ramming,  but  th ree  other types of accidents also have to  be considered: air- 
plane crash,  meteorites,  and internal system failure. The estimation of all 
the  probabilities due to the  six different types of events  a r e  given in Table 4. 
We now discuss how the different reports derived their  estimates:  
C o l l i s i o n s ,  g r o u n d i n g  a n d  r a m m i n g .  Only SAI uses a kinematic model, 
calibrated from historical statist ics,  while in all the  other  reports,  sta- 
tistical inference alone is used. In NMAB (1980) t h e  work of Ligthart 
(1980) and Reese (1978) is described as  outstanding compared with other 
reports.  TNO (1978) relies on Ligthart, and ADL relies on Reese. The 
work of Krappinger (1978 a,b,c) relies strongly on TNO. One can certainly 
not expect the  probabilities of ( I ) ,  (2) ,  and (3) of Table 4 to  be the  same 
for all sites, but  the  difference between FERC (1978) and SAI (1976) is 
certainly hard to  understand. Unfortunately, Cremer and Warner (1977) 
give no estimates a t  all on the  topics listed in  Table 4, and, we therefore 
excluded this report. The only other report ,  Aberdour (1979), takes i ts  
es t imate  directly from HSE (1978),  which was confirmed by Marshall e t  
al. (19'79) who reviewed the report .  
(2) O t h e r  f a i l u r e s .  Only Aberdour, ADL, SAI, and Brotz consider other events; 
the  es t imates  of (4) and (5) are based on historical data.  Only Aberdour, 
ADL, and SAI consider internal system failure; Aberdour, (using data  
from HSE) at t r ibute  their internal system failure ra te  to fire/explosion 
while the  LEG vessel is berthed, although t h e  causes a re  no t  clear.  Sys- 
t e m  failures in the other reports are  due to metallurgical failure. 
The estimates in Table 4 were not always taken directly from t h e  reports; 
in some cases they were adjusted to  take additional data  into account.  For 
example, SAI used more ships with larger tanks t h a n  those currently planned, 
so t h e  probabilities and spill sizes were reduced accordingly. FERC only coa- 
sidered total  spills of one tank (25000 m3), although i t  did provide t h e  data 
for smaller spill sizes as well, and this  was added in  Table 4. The th ree  Krap- 
pinger reports (1978a,b,c) reported a variety of results using different 
accident reduction factors, ranging from 1.0 to  0.05. Because the  la t ter  fac- 
tor was not based on any s ta ted reasoning, we used the  factor 1.0, a s  used in 
Krappinger (1 978a). 
The most interesting findings from this comparison of assessments are: 
(a) Conlpared with the probability of collis~ori, grounding and ramming, 
other events are considered to be unliitely (except for internal failure in 
the Aberdour report). 
(b) The differences in spill probabilities between the three reports for Point 
Conception are substantial (between and 10.' for 10000-25000 m3 
spills). 
(c) Although tanker traffic patterns a t  Eemshaven, Braefoot Bay, and 
Wilhelmshaven are quite different, they all have a total probability of the 
order The spill sizes a t  Eemshaven and Braefoot Bay differ, and are 
not even defined for Wilhelmshaven. 
3.2.2 Transfer system failure 
This type of failure is generally not considered to  be critical (compared 
with vessel accidents and storage tank failure) because the resulting risk is 
relatively low, so that  i t  is not considered in many reports. Possible events 
that could lead to transfer system failure are: meteorites, earthquakes, ram- 
ming, airplane crashes, and other types of internal system failure. The 
overall probabilities for different spill sizes are given in Table 5. Because the 
consequences of an LEG transfer system are no worse than those following a 
vessel accident (for the same spill size), i t  is obvious tha t  such an event 
would not  add significantly to the overall risk. 
TABLE 5 Estimates of LEG transfer system failure; probability of a spill per year. 
Spill size TNO (1978) Cremer and (m3) SAI Brotz Warner 
-- -- 
0s 30 0 Low 1.6~ lo-' Very low 
30s 280 0 0 No spill Very low 
280s 460 lo-4 0 Size given, 0 
but small 
3.2.3 Storage tank rupture 
Finally, we consider the event that could create a very large spill: a 
storage tank rupture. In the literature, i t  is assumed that  one of the follow- 
ing events could cause a rupture: severe winds, airplane or missile crash, 
meteorites, eart.hquakes, internal system failure, and accidents a t  chemical 
plants nearby. In Table 6 we list the estimates of the probabilities of such 
events for the four terminals. 
The estimate of TNO (1978) is based on historical data from an LNG 
peakshaving plant in Rotterdam harbor. Cremer and Warner qualify the pro- 
bability as  "remote", without reference to how this was derived. ADL and SAI 
derive thei r  es t imates  from da ta  on weather condit ions,  ear thquake frequen- 
cies,  and frequencies of airplane c rashes  in the  US. The probabilities for  
in ternal  sys t em (metallurgical)  fai lure were derived f rom technical  ana l j~ses  
of the  meta ls  used and  t empera tu re  variat ions t h a t  could cause  meta l  fat igue 
o r  s t r e s s .  IJsing data  from the  FRG, Brotz e s t ima tes  t h e  probability of a n  air-  
plane hit t ing one of t h e  six tanks  a t  Wilhelmshaven, al though n o  spill s izes 
a r e  given. But after  a n  airplane crash  in to  a s torage  t ank ,  complete  r u p t u r e  
of th is  t ank  c a n  be assumed as  a conservative e s t ima te .  Only SAI considers 
t h e  probability of m o r e  t h a n  one t a n k  ruptur ing a t  a t i m e  due t o  a common 
cause ,  and  t h e  max imum credible spill is considered a s  a s imul taneous  rup-  
t u r e  of all t h r e e  storage tanks  a t  Point  Conception, e a c h  of which will conta in  
77500 m3. SAI adjust  their  probabilities because t h e  tanks  a r e  expected to  be  
e m p t y  approximately 40% of t h e  t ime.  
TABLE 6 Estimates of storage t a n k  failure a n d  probabilities of spills of different sizes 
caused by various events. 
Spill sizes (ms) TNO Cremer AD L S AI Brotz 
a n d  
Warner 
(1) Due t o  s to rms  
0 < 80000 - - -lo-6 0 
80000 < 100000 - - - 0 
100 000 < 150 000 - - - 0 
(2) Due t o  airplane crashes,  missiles, o r  meteori tes  
0 < 80000 - - 3.6x10-~ 5 x 1 0 - ~  
80 000 < 100000 - - 0 - 
100000 < 150000 - - - 0 - 
(3) Due to earthquakes 
0 s 80000 - - 5 . 2 ~ 1 0 - ~  - 
80000 < lC0 000 - - - 0 - 
100000 < 150000 - - - 4 . 7 ~ 1 0 - ~  - 
150000 I 230 000 - - - 3 . 8 ~ 1 0 ~  - 
(4) Due t o  nearby chemical plants 
0 < 80000 - very unlike- 0 
80000 < 100 000 - ly, and no 0 
100000 < 150000 - spill size 0 
given 
(5) Due t o  internal  system failure 
0 80000 - - 2 . 4 ~ 1 0 - ~  0 
80000 < 100000 - - - 0 0 
100000 < 150000 - - - 0 0 
(6) Overall probability per year  
0 < 9000 0 "remote" 0 0 
9000 80000 0 0 B X ~ O - ~  5x10" 
80000 s 100000 0 0 - 0 0 
100000 < 150000 2 ~  1 0 ~  0 - 4 . 7 ~  lo4 0 
150 000 < 230000 0 0 - 3 . 8 ~  lo-' 0 
All LEG storage tanks are built within containment basins that  can hold 
all the contents (in liquefied form) of the tanks. All credible failure scenarios 
assume that these basins will not break and therefore that  all spills will be 
held. 
f i nd ings  
(1) The probabilities of a storage tank rupture a t  all sites (except 
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay and possibly Wilhelmshaven, where not all 
reports are available), are estimated to be of the order of per year. 
(2) A conservative estimate of spill size is generally assumed to be a t  least 
the complete contents of one storage tank. However, Cremer and Warner 
assume tha t  only 15% of the contents of one storage tank will be spilled. 
(3) TNO (1978), ADL, and SAI implicitly or explicitly consider the events 
described in Table 6. In Cremer and Warner it  is not clear what type of 
failures were considered. 
(4) There are no major differences in the estimates, except for (2) between 
ADL and SAI. The reason for this difference is due to changes in missile 
launch plans a t  the nearby Vandenburg Air Force base between the times 
the two reports were written (Elisabeth Drake. ADL, personal communi- 
cation, 1981). 
( 5 )  Common-cause failures that  could result in the rupturing of more than 
one tank are only considered by SAI. 
3.3 Physical Consequences of LEG Spills 
3.3.1 General remarks 
We have so far discussed the probabilities of spills resulting from failures 
of parts of an LEG system, but before we can quantify the number of fatalities 
such spills can cause, we have to consider the properties of spilled LEG and 
how i t  behaves. Only ignition and consequent burning or detonation of spilled 
LEG can produce fatalities caused by thermal radiation effects. If rapid burn- 
ing occurs, explosive blast effects are  also possible, but this is more likely 
with LPG (ethane, propane, butane) than LNG. LEG will immediately s ta r t  to  
vaporize after a spill. resulting in a vapor cloud, which, if not ignited, will 
travel downwind and disperse. All parts of the cloud will eventually reach the 
lower flammability limit of concentration, below which ignition cannot occur. 
To estimate ignition probability i t  is therefore necessary to estimate the size 
of t he  vapor cloud, and the downwind travel distance of the part of the cloud 
tha t  retains a concentration above its lower flammability limit. We first dis- 
cuss the size of the vapor cloud, which depends on the spill size, on meteoro- 
logical conditions, and on whether the spill is on land or on water. We then 
discuss ignition probability estimates for different sites and for different 
events. 
3.3.2 LEG vapor clouds 
Among all topics of LEG risk assessment the question of how LEG behaves 
after a spill has attracted the most scientific interest. So far, empirical stu- 
dies provide data only for LNG spills of up to 50 rn3 on land, and up to 200 m3 
on water. The prediction of the behavior of large spills has therefore had to 
rely on theoretical models, rrhich are not easy to validate. Predictions differ 
for large spills, but they have produced good estimates of observed spills. 
Given the amount of effort made in this still very active research area. 
we do not intend to present a complete review of existing models; rather ,  we 
discuss some of the conclusions of reports that have already reviewed the 
models, present the predictions used in those reports, and try to give some 
idea of what seem to be plausible predictions. 
gnlls o n  Water. Immediately after a spill, LEG star ts  to vaporize. The first 
questions are how long i t  will take until all the LEG has vaporized and how 
large the vapor cloud will be a t  that  time. There are two types of models on 
these questions: one assumes an instantaneous release of LEG (so-called puff 
models) and the other assumes a steady release over a period of time (so- 
called plume models). Puff models predict a cylindrical vapor. cloud with a 
radius equal to that  of the LEG pool. For different LNG spill and pool sizes, 
vaporization times and vapor cloud sizes immediately after all the liquid has 
vaporized are given in Table 7 (Havens 1977, FERC 1978). 
Meteorological data are not important in the prediction of vaporization, 
but atmospheric stability and wind speed are important in determining vapor 
cloud behaviour. The relation of atmospheric stability to weather conditions 
is shown in Table 8. Havens (1980) predicted the maximum downwind travel 
distance of a vapor cloud (above its lower flammability limit) using different 
models, as  shown in Table 9. Although the differences the models in this table 
appear to be great,  one should remember that they were made for various 
levels of atmospheric stability. 
Also, as pointed out in ADL, these predictions are only valid for spills on 
water, because specific landscapes can have different effects on vapor cloud 
dispersion. Havens (1980) considered tha t  the Germeles-Drake and SAI 
models were the most plausible. ADL used the Germeles-nrake model, Aber- 
dour used the  Feldbauer et al. model, while other reports used other models 
not listed in Tables 7 or 9. 
The downwind travel distances of vapor clouds predicted in the  various 
reports are  listed in Table 10. Although the predictions depend on spill size, 
atmospheric stability, and wind speed, not all reports give travel distances for  
all combinations of these three parameters. It should also be noted tha t  
these predictions are again valid primarily over water, which does not 
influence cloud dispersion in a specific way. Dispersion is likely to be faster 
over rough terrain than over water, except in the case of LPG vapor clouds, 
which could accumulate in low-lying areas due to their high density. 
In discussing Table 10 one has to bear in mind tha t  the Aberdour report 
considers LPG,  which has a lower flammability limit of approximately 2% in 
air, in contrast to 5% for LNG. Because this report takes all i ts information 
from HSE (1978), which uses the Feldbauer et al. model, the greater distances 
TABLE 7 Prediction of initial LNG vapor cloud size following different spill sizes on water. 
Column headings: 
(a) Pool radius (m) 
( b )  Vaporization time (min) 
(c) Vapor cloud radius (m) 
( d )  Vapor cloud height (m) 
Puff models 
A1 Fay/Kalelkar (used 
by Germeles-Drake) 
A2 Fay 
A3 Hoult 
A4 Ottermann 
A5 Muscari 
Plume models 
B 1  Burgess e t  al. 
B 2  Feldbauer e t  al. 
B3 FPC 
-- 
100 000 m3 spill 
(a) (b) (c) 
I / Model 
I 
4000 m3 spill 1 10 000 rnhPi l l  
(a) (b) (c) ( d ) / ( a )  (b) (c) ( d )  
25 000 rn3 spill 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
TABLE 0 Relation of atmospheric stability t o  weather  conditions. 
- 
Daytime insolation Night-time conditions 
Surface 
wind speed 
(km/h)  
Strong Moderate Slight Thin overcast 5 3/8 
or 2 4/8 cloudiness 
cloudiness a 
A A-B B 
A-I3 B C E 
B B-C C D 
C C-D D D 
C D D D 
A, extremely unstable conditions 
B, moderately unstable conditions 
C ,  slightly unstable conditions 
D, neutral conditions applicable to heavy overcast; day or night. 
E, slightly stable conditions 
F, moderately stable conditions 
a The degree of cloudiness is defined as that fraction of the sky above the local apparent hor- 
izon that is covered by clouds. 
TABLE 9 Maximum downwind distance of a flammable vapor cloud following a 
25 000m3 spill of LNG onto water, given wind speed of 0 km/h.  
Model Atmospheric Distance from 
stability spill (km) 
Germeles-Drake Stable (F) 18.5 (Cabot Corporation and  ADL) 
Chris 
(US Coast Guard) Stable (F) 
Fay Very stable 28.0 
Burgess e t  al. 
(US Bureau of Mines) Stable 
Feldbauer e t  al. 
(American Petroleum Inst i tute)  Slightly unstable (C) 8.4 
F P C  
s AI 
Neutral (D) 1.2 
Neutral (D) 2.3 
a Range presented to indicate vaporization uncertainty. 
are not surprising. Atmospheric stability level E ,  in combination with a wind 
speed of 8 km/h is used in Aberdour because that  is claimed to be the worst 
case. The Cremer and Warner report is not considered here because i t  does 
not consider cloud behavior. 
Excluding the Aberdour report, the differences between studies are sub- 
stantial. While SAI and Brotz predict relatively short travel distances, ADL 
and FERC predict comparable large distances. It is also worth noting that  the 
distance increases with decreasing wind speed in FERC, while for SAI the dis- 
tance decreases with decreasing wind speed. Also, the data in Table 10 do not 
seem to be completely consistent with those of Table 9 (taken from Havens 
1880) - a point we cannot explain. 
TABLE 10 Maximum downwind travel distance of a flammable vapor cloud following 
an instantaneous LEG spill onto water. 
- -- 
LEG spill Atmospheric Wind speed Downwind travel Report 
size (m3) stabilitya (km/h) distance (km) 
Aberdour 800 E 8.0 4.7 
ADL 1000 A 25.0 0.4 
D 21.0 2 
E 19.8 3 
F 10.8 5 
Aberdour 20 000 E 8.0 19 
Brotz 20 000 A-F All wind 2.3 
speeds 
During night All wind 3.5 
only speeds 
TNO (1978) 25 000 D - 3.3 
E , F  - 10.0 
ADL 25 000 A 25.0 1.0 
D 21.0 7.0 
E 19.8 10.0 
F 10.8 20.0 
FERC 30000 A 25.0 0.5 
16.0 0.5 
9.0 0.6 
D 25.0 4.2 
16.0 4.9 
9.0 5.9 
E 25.0 7.8 
16.0 9.2 
9.0 11.3 
F 25.0 18.1 
16.0 21.6 
9.0 27.1 
S AI 37500 kD.F 54.0 6.0 
GD.F 25.0 3.5 
GD,F 11 2.0 
GD.F 0 1.0 
ADL 50000 A 25.0 1.0 
D 21.0 9.0 
E 19.8 15.0 
F 10.8 25.0 
Aberdour 64 000 E 8.0 32.0 
S AI 88 000 4D,F 11.0 2.5 
ADL 125000 A 25.0 1.5 
D 21.0 11.0 
E 19.8 20.0 
F 10.8 35.0 
-- 
a Atmospheric stability: ranging from A, extremely unstable (rough) to F, moderately stable 
(calm). 
Because the models of TNO (1978), FERC, Aberdour, and Briitz were not 
reviewed, we cannot make a statement on their validity. Havens (1979) com- 
pared the models of ADL and SAI, and concluded that their predictions show 
agreement within the uncertainty ranges. In other words, given the present 
s ta te  of knowledge both models could be acceptable. 
Sjodls o n  Land. Althougl~ possibly larger i r i  s ize,  spills on land a l e  generally 
considered less dangerous than spill:: or water because th r  st.oriigc tanks a r e  
surrounded by dikes, which are  generally not  expected to rupture .  The 
second reason is tha t  the vaporization rate  of LEG on land is slower than that  
on water. This vaporization rate  can be described by (see NMAB 1980). 
vaporization rate  - F 
- -  
area of substrate contacting LEG fi ' 
where t is the t ime after the spill and F is a parameter  characteristic of the 
substrate contacting the LEG. Only TNO (1978), ADL, and SAI consider vapor 
cloud behavior after a spill on land, as  shown in Table 11. Again the  
differences between ADL and SAl are substantial. 
TABLE 11 Downwind travel distance of a flammable vapor cloud following an instan- 
taneous LNG spill on land. 
-- 
Report LNG spill size Atmospheric Wind speed Downwind 
(m3) stabilitya (km/h) travel dis- 
t ance  (km) 
ADL 
S AI 
TNO(1978) 150 000 - - - 
Only 330 m3 will evaporate during first 10 minutes  af ter  
spill, slowing down af ter  th i s  t ime 
87 500 A 25.0 0.5 
D 21.0 2.7 
E 1.9.5 4.6 
F 10.5 15.0 
a Atmospheric stability: ranging from A, extremely unstable (rough) to F, moderately stable 
(calm). 
The low vaporization rate given in TNO (1978) is due to the fact tha t  t he  
surrounding dikes are  only a small distance (some meters)  from the  outer 
wall of the  tank.  The NMAB report therefore recommends fur ther  research t o  
investigate the  consequences of a large spill if the dikes are  some distance 
from the tanks, and to compare that  of high, close-in dikes. Point Conception 
and Wilhelmshaven were planned to have low dikes, while plans for 
Eemshaven and Mossmorran are  for high, close-in dikes. 
Findings  
(1) 'I'he reports indicate that  there  is substantial uncertainty in the max- 
imum downwind travel distance reached by t he  flammable region of an 
unignited vapor cloud. 
(2) Although Table 9 indicates tha t  some models predict greater travel dis- 
tances than the Germeles-Drake model, Havens (1979, 1980) suggests 
tha t  the  Germeles-Drake model is one of the most plausible and is 
therefore reasonably conservative. However, this should not exclude the  
possibility tha t  downwind travel distances could be greater than those 
predicted. 
3.3.3 Ignition or LEG vapor clouds 
Although the  LEG vapor is not toxic i t  can have some effects on humans 
even if not ignited, including skin irritation (because the  vapor is very cold) 
and suffocation problems (if the concentration of the  vapor is high there  
might  not be enough air for breathing). However, compared with the  hazards 
of an ignited vapor cloud these are negligible. 
Ignition probability is composed of two parts: 
(i) Immediate ignition by the event tha t  caused t he  spill. As can be seen 
from Table 12, the probability of jmmediate ignition, depending on t he  
event,  is generally high since an event tha t  can cause a tank t o  rupture  
is also likely to create enough frictional hea t  to ignite the resulting 
vapor cloud. The probabilities of immediate ignition given in Table 12 
a re  derived from expert judgment, even though the expertise required 
for this particular task is difficult to characterize.  
(ii) Delayed ignition due to  some other means. This obviously depends on 
the  presence of ignition sources within t he  flammable bounds of the 
cloud, and will in general have far more serious consequences because a 
vapor cloud increases in size as  i t  travels downwind. In this respect the  
estimates of TNO (1978) and Aberdour are more conservative than the  
others;  certainly, the immediat.e ignition probability can be site- 
dependent. For example, Keeney e l  al. (1979) point out that  estimates 
of immediate ignition probability are  high a t  the specific site studied 
because collisions would involve large vessels carrying flammable car- 
goes such as chlorine. 
Because data on LEG spills a re  limited, estimated ignition probabilities 
can hardly be validated. The reports not listed in Table 12 do not s ta te  the  
ignition probabilities. Neither Cremer and Warner nor Brotz mention ignition 
probability a t  all, while AD1 does, bu t  does not s ta te  the assumptions used. 
The same model for delayed ignition probability is used by FERC, SAI, 
Battelle, and Keeney e t  al. (1979), who assume tha t  each source of ignition 
has t h e  same probability p of igniting the vapor cloud. Thus t he  probability 
TABLE 12 Probabilities of immediate  ignition following different events. 
TN0 (1978) Aberdour FERC S N  Battelle Keeney e t  al. 
Vessel t ank  rup ture  
caused by: 
collision 
grounding 
ramming 
missile/airplane 
meteori te  
internal  failure 
t ransfer  system 
failure 
Storage tank rup ture  
caused by: 
storm/waves 
airplane/missile/ 
meteori tes  
ear thquake 
nearby chemical  
plant 
internal  failure 
Pn that  the vapor cloud will have been ignited within n sources becomes 
Pn = 1 - ( IT)" .  Additionally, all the reports using this model (except FERC), 
assume tha t  all individuals are sources of ignition because they will use facil- 
ities (e.g., car,  oven, light) that  could be direct causes of ignition. FERC 
assumes tha t  each residence is a source of ignition; however, assuming an 
average of four persons per residence, then the FERC estimates are compar- 
able with other reports, as  shown in Table 13. 
TABLE 13 Ignition probabilities per  source in case of delayed ignition. 
FERC Battelle Keeney 
at  al. 
Probability p t h a t  each 
person within a vapour cloud 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.01-0.1 
ignites t h e  cloud 
We present Pn for different p and n in Table 14; estimates of p can be 
either conservative or nonconservative depending on the number of people 
(and thus ignition sources) within the bounds of the vapor cloud. The FERC 
estimate, for example, is less conservative than that  of SAI for Point Concep- 
tion because there are fewer than 130 people (fir 35 residences) within 10 km 
of the  terminal site. Thus the FERC estimate implies that  there is a substan- 
tial probability that  a vapor cloud will not be ignited a t  all, while tha t  of SAI 
implies that  i t  will be ignited with very high probability. On the other hand, 
using the model for Wilhelmshaven, where there are with 43 000 people living 
within 10 km of the terminal site (see Table 3), FERC implies that  the vapor 
cloud will be ignited, but only after i t  has covered a more densely populated 
area than that  predicted using the SAl estimate. 
TABLE 14 Probability that  a vapor cloud will be ignited within n sources for different 
values of p. 
n p = 0.0025 p = 0.01 p =  0.1 
The TNO approach is different. I t  is assumed tha t  a vapor cloud will be 
immediately ignited when it  reaches a populated area, particularly the coast, 
after a vessel accident, or that i t  will be ignited a t  sea by another ship with 
probability of 0.5, or not a t  all. The estimated probabilities for Eemshaven 
are given in Table 15, which was computed by considering tha t  another ship 
would not  necessarily be near the vessel accident site, thus reducing the igni- 
tion probability. The delayed ignition probability a t  the coast is computed 
assuming tha t  not all vapor clouds will be blown towards a coast. 
TABLE 15 Delayed ignition probabilities in TNO (1978). 
Delayed ignition a t  coast after collision 0.05 
Delayed ignition a t  sea after collision 
No delayed ignition after collision 
Delayed ignition at  coast after grounding 0.38 
Delayed ignition at  sea after grounding 0.12 
No delayed ignition after grounding 0.5 
Delayed ignition after transfer system or storage 1.0 
tank rupture 
Comparing the TNO and other estimates, only the range p = 0.01 -0.1 in 
Table 14 can explain the immediate ignition a t  the coast or the 0.5 probability 
of a ship igniting the vapor cloud, given the population density near 
Eemshaven and the number of people on a vessel. It thus falls within the 
range of the estimates given in the other reports. 
3.3.4 Fatalities caused by ignited vapor clouds 
There are two main effects of ignited vapor clouds: thermal effects and 
blast effects. There is no doubt that thermal effects exist, but  i t  is an open 
question whether blast effects due to a deflagration or detonation can occur 
a t  all with methane and i f  so, whether the peak overpressure thus created is 
great enough to cause damage. TNO considers blast effects to be the only 
serious danger and that thermal effects are comparatively minor. Cremer 
and Warner consider both thermal and blast effects, since the  
Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay terminal will handle propane, butane, propane and 
ethylene, which are known to explode in cer ta in  mixtures with air .  ADL con- 
siders only thermal  effects, because an explosion (ejt.her deflngraticln or  detn- 
nation) of methane is believer1 to be very unlikely. FERC and S.41 coilsider 
only thermal  effects. Brotz considers both thermal  and blast  effect.^. 'rtle 
NMAR (1980) report  concludes tha t  LNG vapor cloud explosions rannc t  hc 
ruled out completely, even though there  is no empirical evidence [or  such a. 
possibility 
A first s tep in estimating the number  of deaths within certain distances 
from a spill is to determine the  levels of thermal  radiation and peak overpres- 
su re  above which fatali t ies can be expected. Here one has  to distinguish 
between fatalities caused by primary effects, i.e., those caused directly by 
thermal  radiation and peak overpressure; and secondary eflects, i .e. ,  those 
from fires caused by thermal  radiation, and by buildings t h a t  have collapsed 
due to peak overpressure. NMAB concludes t h a t  the rmal  radiation a t  g rea t  
distances from a major LNG spill can be estimated with reasonable accuracy 
(perhaps within + 30%) from an es t imate  of the  mass burning ra te .  
All reports consider only fatalities from primary the rmal  effects and 
secondary blast effects. Brotz maintains tha t  primary blast effects can be 
ruled out because the  required peak overpressure h a s  never been observed. 
Secondary thermal  effects, however, may affect people sheltered from direct 
radiation, but these a re  very difficult to  es t imate .  One way to  include t h e m  is 
to assume a low radiation level threshold for fatalities. The only report relat- 
ing blast  effects and fatalities is TNO (1978), including the  proportion of fatali- 
ties from secondary effects (see Table 16), where i t  is assumed tha t  the  proba- 
bility of a detonatior~ is 0.01, while the probability for deflagration is 0.99. 
Brotz does not consider such effects a t  all 
TABLE 16 Estimated proportion of fatalities, according to TNO (1978). 
Detonation Deflagration 
(probability 0.0 1) (probability 0.99) 
After ignition a t  coast Within 3.3 km of Within 1.2 k m  of 
after 25000-50 000 rn3 LNG ignition source: 7% ignition source: 1% 
spill on water Within 1.2 km of 
ignition source: 65% 
After ignition a t  coast Within 2.5 km of Within 0.7 k m  of 
af ter  10000 rn3 LNG spill ignition source: 7% ignition source:  1% 
on water Within 0.7 krn of 
ignition source: 65% 
After ignition a t  spill s i te  Within 2 k m  of Within 0.8 km of 
after t ransfer  system or ignition source: 7% ignition source: 1% 
storage tank  rupture.  Within D.8 km of 
resulting in 460 rn3 ignition source: 65% 
evaporated LNG 
The estimated effects of different radiation levels a r e  presented in Table 
17. Given t h a t  t h e  radiation level can be described by (see  ADL): 
where I is t h e  radiation level and  X is the  distance from t h e  center  of the  fire. 
Table 17 implies tha t  the distance from the center of the fire to the lower 
fatality level is about twice as large in ADL than in FERC and SAI. Neither Cre- 
mer and Warner nor Br6tz give a lower fatality level. 
TABLE 17 Effects of different thermal  radiation levels 
-- -- - -- - - -. - - - -- - - - - -- - -- -. 
Radiation Cremer and  AD L FERC S AI 
level Warner (exposure (exposure (exposure 
(kw/m2) time, 30 s) time, 10 s) time, 5 s) 
4.7 Lower level of Lower fatality - 
pain on skin 1 eve1 
- Lower fatality - 
level 
- - Lower fatality 
level 
ADL and FERC consider only the case when vapor cloud ignition occurs, 
shortly after the spill, when the cloud can still be considered cylindrical in 
shape. In Table 18 the distance from the center of the fire to the lower fatal- 
ity level is given for different spill sizes on water (ADL and FERC), although 
distances only apply to  people not sheltered. Moreover, a conservative esti- 
mate is tha t  all people within certain distances are unsheltered and thus 
become fatalities. AUL, also considers fires resulting from a storage tank spill 
into the  surrounding dikes, and concludes tha t  the distance from the center  
of the  fire to the  lower fatality level is 550m. SAI uses a complex model to  
compute radiation levels, including the case of delayed ignition. 
TABLE 18 Distance from point of LNG spill t o  lower fatality level in case of ignition a t  
t h e  spill s i te  on water  for different spill sizes. 
Distance to  lower fatality level of 
radiation from t h e  point of spill (km) 
Spill size 
(m3) ADL FERC 
Findings 
(1) The reports disagree on the major causes of fatalities. While TNO (1976) 
assumes t ha t  all fatalities will be caused by secondary effects of vapor 
cloud explosions, ADL, FERC, and SAI assume tha t  all fatalities will be 
caused by thermal  radiation. Neither Brotz nor Cremer and Warner esti- 
mate t he  number of fatalities resulting from ignited vapor clouds. 
(2) There is also some disagreement as to the radiation level above which 
there will be fatalities, but ADL adopts the most conservative estimate. 
(3) Only TNO (1976) and SAI include the effects of delayed ignition in their 
calculations. While ADL and FERC do consider. delayed ignition, they only 
include immediate ignition a t  the  spill site. 
(4) The effects of LNG and LPG vapor clouds differ because it  is known that  
LPG vapor clouds can explode more easily. Because thermal radiation 
levels are  about the same, an LPG vapour cloud is thus potentially much 
more hazardous than an LNG vapor cloud of the same size. 
3.3.5 Effects on nearby industries 
The ignition of an LEG vapor cloud can have effects on nearby industrial 
plants, perhaps with serious secondary effects on people living or working in 
vicinity. Except a t  Point Conception there are chemical plants near all the  
LEG terminals.  This point was considered by both Brotz and Cremer and 
Warner, but  they concluded tha t  these effects would not increase t he  overall 
risk significantly. TNO (1976) points out tha t  in case of detonation a nearby 
ammonia storage tank could collapse with catastrophic consequences, since a 
lethal ammonia cloud could extend tens of kilometers. 
3.4 Demographic and Meteorological Data 
It is necessary t o  consider meteorological and demographic data for the  
different sites because wind speeds and atmospheric stability play an impor- 
t an t  role in determining the movement of unignited vapor clouds. Data on 
wind direction and population density are  necessary to determine the  
number of people a t  risk from any given accident; Table 19 gives the relevant 
data for the  four sites. 
In addition to  the populated areas in the vicinity of Eemshaven, there is 
the  island of Borkum, within 1.5km of the tanker route to and from the  ter- 
minal. The island's population is not known to us, but the risk to t he  inhabi- 
tants is considered in TNO (1976). Also, the island of Wangerooge is only 3 k m  
from the main tanker route to  Wilhelmshaven. There are about 2000 inhabi- 
tants,  and this increases substantially during the summer due to tourists. 
3.5 Assessment of Population Risk 
3.5.1 Implications of the definitions of risk 
Each of t he  definitions of risk adopted in Section 1.2 addresses a 
different aspect of risk from a social tind political perspective. The first two 
definitions (the probability of exceeding specific numbers of fatalities per 
year, and the  total number of fatalities per year) are  measures of societal 
TABLE 19 Meteorological and demographic data for the four sites. 
Percentage of 
different atmospher- 
ic stabilities 
AB,C 
D 
E 
F 
Percentage of 
different average 
wind speeds (km/h) 
1 5.5 
5.5 1 8.8 
8.8 5 16.1 
16.1 l 24.9 
24.9 5 34.6 
34.6 5 45.1 
< 45.1 
Percentage of time 
wind is  blowing from 
LEG terminal to- 
wards populated 
area (land) 
Population density 
within a given dis- 
tance of LEG termi- 
nal (per km2) 
1 Zkm 
s 5 k m  
S10 km 
Populated area 
(land) within a given 
distance of LEG ter- 
minal (in km2) and 
percentage of total 
area: 
5 2km 
1 5 km 
110 k m  
Eemshaven 
Not known, but 
probably similar 
to Wilhelmshaven 
34 (estimated 
from data for 
Wilhelmshaven) 
Mossmorran- 
Braefoot Bay 
Point Wilhelmshaven Conception 
16.9 11 
28.2 61 
41.5 12 
13.4 7 
( the remain- 
ing 9% are  not 
given) 
6 
14 Not given 
26 "Dominant" 
54 Not given 
risk, involving impacts that fall on society as a whole, i.e., those directly 
affected and those observing the effects. The last two definitions (the proba- 
bility of an  individual in a specific group becoming a fatality per year and the 
probability of an exposed individual becoming a fatality per year) are meas- 
ures of individual risk dealing with direct impacts. 
Risk, by the  first definition (risk of multiple fatalities), is  typical!^ 
displayed as a complementary cumulative probability distribution: the  probo- 
bility per year tha t  the  number  ol fatalities will exceed z plotted against x .  
Such a curve, also called Rasrnussen curve, contains informati011 not  avail- 
able in  the  individual probabiiities: the  effect of correlations between those 
probabilities. A Rasmussen curve addresses the  sensitivity to  catastrophe 
found in the  political perspective of risk. For example, consider two facilities 
tha t  cause equal numbers of fatalities per year.  In one 1acilit.y these are  
bunched into  very rare  catastrophes,  and in the  other they a re  spread over 
common small  accidents. The former facility may therefore encounter  
greater political opposition due t o  sensitivity t o  catastrophe. The Rasmussen 
curve is the  only format used to illustrate risk by our adopted definitions t h a t  
addresses this sensitivity. 
The second definition (expected fatalities per  year) is appropriate for 
particular types of analysis, such as cost-benefit or risk-benefit analysis, 
where social preference is assumed to be linear in t e rms  of the  number  of 
lives lost. 
The th i rd  definition ( the  probability of an individual in a specific group 
becoming a fatality per  year) could be used t o  address the  sensitivity toward 
equity found in a political perspective of risk. This measure enables one t o  
determine in some sense how much  of t h e  risk is being borne by local 
residents,  tourists,  e tc . ,  and also allows separate  determinations of occupa- 
tional and nonoccupational risks, which are  often t reated quite differently in 
political and social processes. 
Risk as defined by t h e  fourth definition ( the  probability of an exposed 
individual becoming a fatality per year) is simply an average over the group 
risk measured by the thi rd  definition. This measure  is somewhat trouble- 
some because i t  is dependent on t h e  definition of an exposed population. If 
"exposed" is defined a s  meaning an individual probability of death of greater  
than 10-l2 per year, t h e  individual risk will be averaged over a region extend- 
ing not  fa r  from the facility. On the o ther  hand, if "exposed" is defined with a 
cut-off probability of per year, the individual risk will be averaged over a 
much  larger region, and will be much  lower. In spite of th is  shortcoming, 
individual risk is a measure t h a t  allows a convenient comparison between the  
measured risk and  more routine risks the  individual may face, such as those 
from smoking, driving, e tc .  While such comparisons do not  fit in to  a decision 
or choice framework (who decides between smoking and living near  a termi- 
nal?), they do provide readily understandable benchmarks for judging the  
risk of a facility. 
3.5.2 Quantkflcation of risks 
Before presenting the  estimated risks from the  reports we want to show 
how these concepts are  interrelated and what information is needed to  com- 
pute them.  Here we follow closely Keeney e t  al. (1979). 
The probability Pr(z) of x fatalities per year is calculated from 
where Pr(x ISi) is the probability of z fatalities resulting from an  event Si 
and h.(S,) is the annual probability of event Si. The expected number of 
fatalities F(Si) due to event Si is calculated from 
These formillas provide the basis for quantifying all of the  public risks. 
Societal risk is indicated by the expected number of fatalities F per year, 
and is calculated from 
where the contributions of all possible events are summed together 
Individual r i sk  is measured by the annual risk level R to an individual in 
an exposed population and is found by dividing the expected annual number 
of fatalities by the total number of people exposed, N, yielding 
This risk level is the probabi1it.y that  an  exposed individual will be a fatality in 
a specific year. 
If for each accident scenario Si the  expected number of fatalities FG(Si) 
in a group G is tabulated, the total fatalities FG per year in tha t  group G is 
found to be 
The individual risk RG in a particular group G is 
W risk o f  multiple fatalities is given by the  probability that  the  
number of fatalities in a given year is equal to  or greater than a specific level 
y .  This can be calculated directly from eqn. ( I ) ,  and is simply the sum of the 
probability of y fatalities, y + l  fatalities, and so on. Hence 
In Section 3.2. the different events Si and their probabilities fi (St) were 
considered, and the probabilities Pr(z I Si) were discussed in Section 3.3. The 
resulting estimates of t he  societal risk, t he  individual risk and the risk of 
multiple fatalities are given in Table 20. Estimates of the risks were not given 
in either Brotz or  Cremer and Warner. 
TABLE 20 Estimates of risks for t h e  different sites.a 
TNO Aberdour ADL FE RC SAI 
Societal risk Not 
(fatalities per year)  4 x est imated 7 x lo-' 1 o - ~  
Individual risk 
(probability of fatality 
per  year)  r 7 x 1 0 - ~  7 ~ 1 0 - ~  < 9 ~ 1 0 - ~  8 x 1 0 - ~  
Number of people Not 
at r isk > 5 0 0 0  defined > 8 0  15 90  
Risk of multiple fatal- 
ities: probabiiity t h a t  
number  of fatalities 
per  year  will be  
> 1 3 x 1 0 - ~  Not lo-6 Not 6 x  
> 10 lo4  est imated 10-~-6x est imated 3 x  10-l1 
> 100 5 x 10-8 
> 1000  5 x 10-8 
$ fl 
> 5 0 0 0  3 x lo-? 
$ fl 
Id fl 
a Note that the SAI estimates have not been adjusted to make them compatible with ADL, and 
FERC, as has been done elsewhere in the text. Therefore, the risk of the smaller LNG terminal 
currently planned, as estimated by SAI, would be lower than those presented here, so that the 
differences between risk assessments here and in the text are in some sense understated. 
Not surprisingly, Point Conception has the lowest risk of the three Cali- 
fornian sites, but the various reports often considered quite different events, 
and the probabilities Fr(x I Si) and Pr(S,) also varied for the same event and 
for the same site. 
It should also be noted that  the SAI estimate was given for an LNG termi- 
nal with more storage tanks and larger tankers than is currently planned. 
Although we adjusted the estimates in earlier sections to make them compar- 
able with ADL and FERC, this was not done in Table 20. Therefore, the risk of 
the smaller LNG terminal, as estimated by SAI, would be lower than that  
stated. The individual risk depends on the total number of people exposed, N, 
which is not always defined in the same way. Depending on how many people 
are assumed to be exposed a t  a specific site, the individual risk can vary 
between assessments even when the societal risk is the same. 
If for each accident scenario S' the expected number of fatalities FG(Si) 
in a group G is tabulated, the total fatalities FG per year in that group G is 
found to be 
The individual risk RG in a particular group G is 
lhe risk of multiple fatalities is given by the probability that the  
number of fatalities in a given year is equal to or greater than a specific level 
y .  This can be calculated directly from eqn. ( I ) ,  and is simply the sum of the 
probability of y fatalities, y t1 fatalities, and so on. Hence 
In Section 3.2. the different events Si and their probabilities Pr(Si) were 
considered, and the probabilities A.(z 1 S.) were discussed in Section 3.3. The 
resulting estimates of the societal risk, the individual risk and the risk of 
multiple fatalities are  given in Table 20. Estimates of the  risks were not given 
in either Brotz or Cremer and Warner. 
Not surprisingly, Point Conception has the lowest risk of the three Cali- 
fornian sites, but the various reports often considered quite different events, 
and the probabilities *(z 1%) and Pr(Si) also varied for the  same event and 
for the same site. 
It should also be noted tha t  the SAI estimate was given for an  LNG termi- 
nal with more storage tanks and larger tankers than is currently planned. 
Although we adjusted the estimates in earlier sections to  make them compar- 
able with ADL and FERC, this was not done in Table 20. Therefore, the risk of 
the smaller LNG terminal, as estimated by SAI, would be lower than tha t  
stated. The individual risk depends on the total number N, of people exposed, 
which is not always defined in the same way. Depending on how many people 
are assumed to be exposed a t  a speciflc site, the individual risk can vary 
between assessments even when the societal risk is the same. 
4 EVALUATION OF LEG mRMtNAL RISK ASSESSMENTS 
It has become clear tha t  in these reports there are substantial disagree- 
ments on both the  probabilities and the consequences of events, even for the 
same site. There also exist discrepancies between sites tha t  cannot be 
explained by the  different LEG terminal systems and the respective locations. 
However, because risk assessments are produced for specific decision- 
oriented purposes we also have to ask whether they serve those purposes well. 
Thus we now evaluate them from two aspects, i.e., their scientific quality, and 
their usefulness in the decision-making process. Although these are cer- 
tainly correlated there are specific questions related to  each one. 
4.1 Shortcomings of LEG Ftisk Assess~llents 
Two questions are discussed in this section: 
(1) Could the scientific quality of the  risk assessment reports discussed in 
Section 2 have been improved, and in what way? 
(2) Can a risk assessment,  even a scientifically perfect one, be extended or 
improved to become a more effective aid ill the decision-making pro- 
cess? 
4.1.1 Scientific quality of risk assessments 
The clear objective of a risk assessment is to  es t imate  the  level of risk, 
in this case,  t h a t  steins from an  LEG terminal facility. There are  three  ques- 
tions related t o  t h e  scientific quality of a risk assessment :  whether or not a 
reasonable definition of risk is used; whether or not  the  estimate of the  risk is 
accurate  in some probabilistic sense; and how t h a t  accuracy can be verified. 
As we have shown in Section 1.2, the re  is no unique definition of risk, so  
any report should give a precise definition of t h e  type of risk being estimated 
and should also explain why t h a t  particular definition has been used. In our 
opinion the risk definition used in Keeney e t  al. (1979) is the  most reasonable 
of all those concerned with fatalities, and the concept behind i t  should also be 
applied t o  consequences other than  fatalities, such  as  financial losses. 
Whatever definition of risk is used, the  question remains  a s  to the  accu- 
racy of the  estimate of t h a t  risk, which is crucial  to the  entire area  of risk 
analysis. I t  was first broadly discussed when the Rasmussen Report (NRC 
1975) was published, and has remained an important  issue ever since. As we 
showed in Section 3 there a re  substantial  differences between risk assess- 
ments  on all th ree  dimensions of risk assessment:  t h e  events considered, 
their probabilities, and their consequences. All reports claim tha t  their esti- 
mates  a r e  conservatively high and only a few mention uncertainties in  the  
estimates.  We now discuss the  different problems of accuracy in  more detail. 
Events considered.  The reports disagree substantially on the  events con- 
sidered, even for the  same LEG facility. One possible event, sabotage, is 
not considered in any of them.  It would perhaps be scientifically more 
precise to say tha t  t h e  results of these  risk assessments a re  conditional 
estimates of the  risk, assuming t h a t  particular events, such  as  sabotage, 
do not happen. I t  is important  to realize t h a t  th is  is a simplification of 
reality t h a t  any scientific model builder has to  cope with, since all 
models require simplification. However, i t  is important  to mention in a 
risk assessment  the  assumptions under  which the  estimate is valid. 
Clearly, cer ta in  events a r e  not considered for good reasons; specifically, 
some are a priori considered unimportant or a re  nearly impossible to 
quantify, like sabotage. This results,  however, in the  notion of risk 
assessment as  being an  es t imate  of risk, conditional on certain assump- 
tions. 
Estimation o f  probabilities. Probabilities a r e  derived from frequency dis- 
tributions, personal (expert) judgment,  and combinations of t h e  two. 
The use of historical data  to es t imate  probabilities of future events is 
very appropriate, unless major changes in t h e  likelihood of events occur. 
If fu ture  events a r e  expected to difTer from those in  the  past,  o r  if histor- 
ical data do not  exist, one therefore has to rely on t h e  judgment of 
experts. This method - the Bayesian approach to probability - is con- 
ceptually well founded in the axioms of rational behavior (see Lindley 
1973, Luce and Raiffa 1957) and is used extensively in decision analysis 
under a single important assumption: that  the analysis involves a single 
decision maker. In such a case it  is conceptually feasible tha t  the deci- 
sion maker's personal judgment or a single source of expertise commis- 
sioned to generate those probabilities would be adequate, but in our case 
this assumption is not appropriate. If a risk estimate depends heavily on 
expert judgment, the results may be biased by the particular expert 
used. One set  of results cannot be readily held to be more reliable than 
another se t  generated by another expert who believes in different proba- 
bilities. Yet in analyses of processes as poorly understood as LEG 
accident scenarios, the use of expert judgment in deriving probabilities 
cannot be avoided. While i t  is clearly desirable to minimize the role of 
such estimates, that  requires data collection, which is expensive in 
te rms  of both time and money. In any decision process such as that  
involved in LEG terminal siting, trade-offs will be made between cost and 
decision quality in such a way that  expert judgment plays an important 
role. I t  follows tha t  in any LEG risk assessment, the  sensitivity of the  
estimates to a range of different expert judgments should be clearly 
specified. 
Estimation of consequences. Before the consequences of an event can be 
analyzed it  must be clear what aspects of risk are to be considered - 
fatalities, injuries, or financial losses due to an accident. To estimate 
any one of these risks the consequences of events must  be stated in the 
same terms,  i.e., the number of fatalities, number of injuries, or the  
amount of financial losses. Reports tha t  consider consequences only in 
te rms  of the  amount of LEG spilled, density of thermal radiation, or the  
like, cannot estimate risk in terms the public or the  decision maker can 
understand. Many, but not all, reports consider consequences in terms 
of the  number of fatalities; none deals with injuries or financial losses 
explicitly, and only a few consider the consequences in te rms  of spill size 
or thermal radiation. Even those dealing with the number of fatalities 
differ t o  some extent with respect to  consequences, mainly due to the 
lack of experience with large LEG spills and doubts as to  how to model 
LEG vapor cloud behavior. Thus i t  is not known precisely how many peo- 
ple near an  LEG terminal are a t  risk, although i t  is possible that  these 
uncertainties could be reduced in the near fu.ture in the light of current  
research into large LEG spills. 
We now turn  t o  the  problem of evaluating the scientific accuracy of risk 
assessments. Although we have identified some important factors, i t  is 
nonetheless very difficult to  identify the most accurate reports because they 
deal with such extremely rare (or low-probability) events. 
Crucial to the  growth of scientific knowledge is the ability to marshal1 
evidence tha t  a certain scientific s tatement  or theory is false. In fact, as 
some philosophers such as Karl Popper argue, i t  is not possible to  prove the 
correctness of a scientific statement, bu t  only to prove its falsity. An 
example from the history of physics supports this view: a very strongly held 
theory, Newton's laws of motion, was only shown to be false, or, to be more 
precise, was shown by Einstein to be a special case of relativity theory after 
more than 200 years. Not all scientific statements can be shown to be false, 
for two reasons. One is that  a scientific statement may be so accurate tha t  
any at tempt to prove its falsity fails; the other is tha t  a scientific s tatement  
is so imprecise, or concerns such inaccessible events (e.g., in the distant 
future), that  i t  is not currently possible to prove its falsity. But the latter 
type of scientific statement is much weaker than the first. While the laws of 
physics are of the first type, Marx's forecast of the economic development of 
industrialized countries is a scientific theory of the second type. 
Let us now look a t  LEG risk assessment. It is not difficult to design 
experiments tha t  could prove tha t  certain predicted consequences are false. 
This could be achieved, for example by experimenting with large LEG spills. 
But i t  is difficult to prove that a risk estimate is incorrect because important 
events are not considered or because the probabilities are wrong. The reason 
for this is the fact that ,  by definition, low-probability events occur very rarely 
and not in a deterministic manner. Even data on LEG terminal system 
behavior for 20 or 30 years would provide very little information, because 
very few accidents, if any, would have occurred. Such experience can only 
put an upper bound on a probability of occurrence a t  a particular confidence 
level, a bound that  may be far greater than the very low probabilities involved 
in LEG risk assessment. 
There is no easy way to resolve the problem of validating estimates of 
low-probability events. For this reason, Weinberg (1982) considers risk 
assessment to be an  "art" because "there are,  and will always be, strong 
trans-scientific elements in risk assessment". However, the  fact remains t ha t  
risk assessment is an "art" tha t  is a more desirable means of estimating risk 
than any other alternative. 
4.1.2 Risk assessments as decision aids 
We now discuss the shortcomings of LEG risk assessments as decision 
aids and how they can be improved. It is first necessary to identify the two 
types of decision problems for which risk assessments are used: the choice of 
a specific site for an LEG facility, and the decision as to  whether or not cer- 
tain risk-mitigating measures should be introduced. Although i t  is not 
clearly stated, i t  seems tha t  risk reports prepared for Point Conception and 
Eemshaven were used as inputs to both types of decisions, whereas those 
prepared for a t  Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay and Wilhelmshaven were primarily 
used for decisions on mitigating measures. 
Of course, both decision problems are not only concerned with risk t o  
life; consequences such as costs, benefits, environmental impact, and supply 
interruption risk are also important dimensions. From a decision analysis 
point of view one should first clarify the alternatives and then quantify the  
consequences of each, as shown in the decision t rees of Figure 1. The siting 
decision is of course not independent of the decision on which technical 
Site Consequences i f  site 1 is selected 
Site 2 '  Consequences i f  site 2 is selected 
LEG terminal 
siting decision Consequences i f  site 3 is selected 
Site N 
Consequences i f  site N is selected 
No site 
at  all \
Possible alternative 
decisions i f  no LEG 
terminal is built, and 
the consequences o f  
these alternatives 
Technical standard 1 
/ I Consequences 1 
Decision o n  
mitigating 
measures at Consequences 2 
given site 
l ~ e c h n i c a l  standard 3 I Consequences 3 
Technical standard M ( Consequences M 
FIGURE 1 Decision trees for the main decisions on LEG terminals 
standards to employ for the terminal,  a fact tha t  further complicates the pro- 
cess. However, a t  some point a trade-off has to be made between the  conse- 
quences of t he  decision, e.g., costs, benefits, risk, etc.  This is exactly the  
point where questions like "How safe is safe enough?" or "What level of risk is 
acceptable?" are raised. In a decision analysis framework one should instead 
ask questions like: "Is i t  preferable to reduce the expected number of fatali- 
ties and to increase t he  price of natural gas (by specific amounts),  or should 
the expected number of fatalities remain a t  lo8 per year and the  price of gas 
remain the same as i t  is now?" There is no scientific approach to answering 
such questions. In fact, there  is not  even a unique way of answering such 
questions for society as a whole, because we do not know of a unique way to  
aggregate preferences of individuals into a societal preference l is t .  No 
m a t t e r  what t h e  results of the  risk assessment may  be, differer~t people will 
come up with different solutions to  t11c problenls posed in Figure 1 berause  
individual personal trade-offs between risk and other  consequences will 
always differ. 
There is n o  way to  make an  "objectively correct  decision" for society 
based on a risk assessment  or any other  scientific method.  It is also impor- 
t a n t  t o  realize t h a t  t h e  consequences of decisions vary for different groups of 
people. For example,  no t  many people a re  directly exposed to  t h e  risk of an 
LEG terminal ,  while many receive the  benefits, such as t h e  availability of 
na tu ra l  gas.  On the  o the r  hand, i f  no individual is exposed to the  risk because 
no LEG terminal  is built, gas consumers  might have to  pay a higher price o r  
might  not  receive it all. Thus there  is a conflict of in te res t s  t h a t  cannot  be 
resolved scientifically. Although this reasoning is not new, some sections of 
society still tend to  believe t h a t  risk assessments can  make decisions more  
objective or t h a t  the  risk analysts can answer t h e  question of whether o r  no t  
the  result ing risk is acceptable. 
In the  past ,  decisions concerning technological risk have largely been 
made by t h e  engineers and  companies who plan the  facilities: civil engineers 
decide on t h e  safety level of dams, and airplane industries and regulatory 
commissions decide on t h e  safety level of airplanes. Although th i s  is a gen- 
erally accepted practice one m u s t  be aware tha t  underlying these decisions 
are  subjective trade-offs between safety (or risk) levels and other  factors.  If 
some groups do not  accept these trade-offs there  is no scientific way t o  prove 
t h e m  wrong. As shown in Table 1, both Brotz and Cremer  and  Warner s t a te  
t h a t  t h e  risk of LEG is  acceptable, a s t a tement  t h a t  canno t  be defended on 
scientific grounds.  This does no t  mean,  of course,  t h a t  t h e  risk will be  
acceptable to all the  parties involved. 
Risk assessrnents can.not resolve the conflicting trade-offs between t h e  
consequences of decisions relat.ing to LEG; nor can  they provide a n  answer a s  
t o  whether a risk is acceptable. But  they can be a n  impor tan t  tool in t h e  
decision process. First, they can be used t o  identify particularly weak o r  
risky components in a system,  and so enable t h e  planners t o  improve facility 
design, as is often done in  airplane design. Secondly, on a political level, r isk 
assessments  can  be used to analyze LEG risks in detail  and compare t h e m  
with o the r  societal risks such as  driving, e tc .  We believe, however, t h a t  r isk 
assessments  a re  mos t  appropriately used within a decision analysis frame- 
work to enable decision makers  and interes t  groups to compare  t h e  risks a n d  
benefits of different decision alternatives, as shown in  Figure 1. Although a 
risk assessment  is a prerequisite for doing this,  we would argue t h a t  i t s  
extension t o  risk-benefit analysis, and ultilnately i t s  use  within decision 
analysis, would be t t e r  sui t  t h e  decision problems under  consideration than 
risk assessment  alone. This is because the  absolute r isk  is never  t h e  dom- 
inating factor  in a decision. What mat te r s  is the  relative risk compared with 
t h e  alternatives.  
4.2 Significance of Differences Between Risk Assessments 
As we have seen in Section 3 there are important differences between 
risk assessment reports, and it  is of interest to identify specific reasons for 
these, and to  determine to what extent and in which direction these affect 
the risk estimates. 
Although there are clear discrepancies between the reports for 
Wilhelmshaven and Mossmorran-Braefoot Bay on the one hand, and Point 
Conception and Eemshaven on the other, i t  is not a t  all. clear whether this is 
because of differences in cultural styles, in the consulting firms responsible 
for the reports, in the purposes of the reports, in analytical and financial 
resources, or some other  unknown factors. Although it  cannot be substan- 
tiated, the expectations of the client, as well as the scientific background of 
the analyst, are likely to  be significant reasons for the differences. 
TABLE 21 Ranking of risk assessments for Point Conception in terms of conservatism 
of estimates on special issues. 
Conservative Less conservative 
1 2 3 
Completeness of events considered SAI ADI, FERC 
Spill probability due to ship collision FERC ADL SAI 
Spill sizes considered ADL SAI E R C  
Spill probability due to storage tank failure SAI ADI, - 
Spill sizes considered SAI ADL - 
Maximum travel distance of vapor cloud ADL FERC SAI 
after a spill on water 
Maximum travel distance of vapor cloud ADL S AI - 
after spill on land 
Lower fatality level of thermal radiation ADL FERC SAI 
Delayed ignition probability SAI FERC - 
Overall risk FERC ADL SAI 
-- 
While the reasons for the differences cannot be ascertained, their extent 
indicates the amount of leeway left to  analytical judgment. As this report has 
made clear, several decisions must  be made in the course of performing a 
risk assessment, such as  how to characterize risk, what presentation formats 
to use, what gaps to fill with which assumptions, of what degree of conserva- 
tism, which of several conflicting models to use, how to indicate the degree of 
confidence of the results, and which events simply to omit from the analysis. 
These decisions can push the results in any direction. Very conservative 
assumptions increase risk estimates; clear presentations of expert disagree- 
ments can reduce confldence in the results; and particular formats highlight 
particular aspects of the risk. These decisions can push the  results of an 
analysis over such a large range that  the final result may be affected more by 
the predilections of the analyst than  the physical features of the site or tech- 
nology. This same result was found in a comparison of three risk assessments 
performed for a proposed terminal a t  Oxnard, California (FPC, SAI, and SES; 
see Lathrop and Linnerooth 1981). 
When looking at  the three reports prepared for Point Conception there is 
no indication that  one report is any more (or less) conservative in its overall 
risk estimate than the others, as shown in Table 21. However, if we take the 
most conservative estimates of the three reports for each topic the resulting 
overall risk would be substantially higher than the estimated risk in Table 20. 
4.3 Dealing with Uncertainties 
There are important problems in determining and portraying the accu- 
racy of risk estimates. Some reports deal with some of the uncertainties, as  
shown in Table 22, but the greatest uncertainties are acknowledged in Bat- 
telle, where i t  is stated that  
For both the number of expected fatalities per event and the correspond- 
ing annual frequencies, the lower limit of the confidence intervals should 
be considered to be significantly less than 0.1 times the given values, t he  
upper limit over 10 times the  given values. In some cases the upper limit 
is given by the total number of persons a t  risk. 
TABLE 22 Uncertainties in risk estimates. 
Report Range of expected 
number of fatalities per 
year 
ADL 4 ~ 1 0 - ~ - 7 ~ 1 0 - ~  
Battelle ~t least l o 4  - lo -4  
Keeney e t  al. 1.7x - 2 x 
SES 1.5X - 5.7X 10' 
Reasons for range 
Population density - present or future; 
active time of ignition source 
Percentage of fatalities among people en- 
veloped by a burning plume, and other 
conservative assumptions 
Probability of vessel accident; probability 
of immediate and delayed ignition of va- 
por cloud 
Probability of ignition per source; max- 
imum travel distance of fiammable vapor 
cloud 
Maximum travel distance of vapor cloud, 
probability of vessel accident 
The reports not listed in Table 22 do not explicitly consider or present uncer- 
tainties in their risk estimates at  all; even those that  do, disagree as to what 
these are, and the relevant range that  these values can take. We consider as 
particularly uncertain the estimates of probabilities of events stemming from 
expert judgment. Sensitivity analysis for LEG should therefore involve a t  
least the following parameters: 
probability of an  LEG vessel accident resulting in a spill; 
probabilities of immediate and delayed ignition of an LEG vapor cloud; 
probabilities of transfer system and storage tank failure resulting in a 
spill. 
The maximum downwind travel distance of a flammable' LEG vapor cloud. 
seems to us to  be a less critical topic because this will be primarily deter- 
mined by the delayed ignition probability, since the probability tha t  a vapor 
cloud will be ignited before i t  reaches its maximum extent is very high over 
populated areas. This view is also supported by Battelle: 
The uncertainties resulting from the application of simple, experimentally 
unverified models describing the dynamics of the  LEG vapor are not con- 
sidered to be critical for the assessment of the risk. 
To show how large the differences between accident probabilities can be, 
i t  is helpful to examine the probability of a spill resulting from a vessel 
accident per year a t  Point Conception (see Table 4). This probability was 
estimated as 9.9 x by SAI, as 7.7 x by ADL, and as 8.1 x loa3 by FERC. 
If this range of the order of lo4 is taken as  the possible range on the probabil- 
ity, the range of the societal risk as given in Table 20 should also be of the 
order of lo4, because the probability of a spill on water is essentially multipli- 
catively related to the expected number of fatalities per year. The reason 
why the difference between the FERC and SAI estimates in Table 20 is not tha t  
great is because FERC makes less conservative assumptions on other issues, 
as  shown in Table 21. 
From this small example of sensitivity analyses we would argue tha t  the 
range of uncertainty given in Battelle and SES of the order of a t  least lo2 is 
defendable as a minimum range for most risk estimates, even if not  men- 
tioned explicitly. Of course, this is very rough, and i t  is certainly necessary 
to perform thorough sensitivity analyses before making more precise state- 
ments  on the  ranges of uncertainty. 
But a more general point should be made here. Each report poses as a 
representation of the current state of knowledge regarding LEG risks, but  
because tha t  knowledge is incomplete, a t  least some of the reports represent 
i t  using probabilistic terms or error bounds. Yet each report is based on a 
different s tate  of knowledge: different assumptions are made, models used, 
probabilities estimated, etc.  No one report in fact represents a comprehen- 
sive representation of the current  state of knowledge When SAI gives a pro- 
bability of 9.9~10-?, and FERC gives ~ . I x I o - ~ ,  the policy maker is somewhat 
a t  a loss as to which is the most appropriate probability upon which to base 
his actions. There is some "societal subjective probability" that  most likely 
lies between those two probabilities, since each represents only a subset of 
the total state of knowledge Yet neither report acknowledges that  the other 
estimate exists' What is needed here is a "meta-analysis" combining the 
different estimates and models, and thus representing a larger fraction of the 
available knowledge than any one of the existing risk assessments. 
A meta-analysis would be more objective than  any of the existing reports 
because if two consulting firms were each asked to do such a meta-analysis, 
the two reports would then probably be more in agreement than, say, the SN 
and FERC. Such an  analysis would also have much  larger error  bounds, or  
broader probability distributions, than t h e  existing analyses. While policy 
makers  would prefer more precise es t imates  of risk, our present s ta te  of 
knowledge simply does not warrant such s ta tements .  That imprecision in our  
knowledge about LEG risks should be clearly communicated to readers of risk 
assessment  reports.  
5 GUIDELWES FOR SI'ANDARDIZED LEG RISK ASSESSblENTS 
In this  section we organize our findings in  t h e  form of guidelines for 
preparing a standardized risk assessment.  These are  m e a n t  to  suggest ways 
of improving risk assessments, and also t o  enable someone unfamiliar with 
the  field to evaluate such reports.  The guidelines a r e  intended to improve 
both scientific and  decision-aid aspects of LEG risk assessments.  Much of the  
following has already been s ta ted elsewhere in this report ,  yet  we feel tha t  i t  
is useful to present  in summary form: 
Lkfinition of risk. Because the re  are  several different definitions and 
concepts of risk, the  particular one used in  a n  assessment should be 
made clear.  In addition, the  reason for the  choice of t h a t  particular risk 
definition should be explained. 
Completeness of considered events. It is conceptually impossible to be 
sure t h a t  all possible hazardous events have been included in an assess- 
ment ,  but t h e  events listed in Tables 4, 5, and 6 should be considered. 
Other events tha t  couId add substantially to the  risk (such as  sabotage) 
but  were not  considered for some reason, should be mentioned, so tha t  
the  reader  can appreciate tha t  the  validity of the  risk es t imate  is condi- 
tional on cer ta in  assumptions. 
Estimation of probabilities. Whenever possible, probabilities should be 
estimated using data  ra ther  than  judgment,  and any judgmental proba- 
bilities should be identified. Furthermore,  a number  of experts should 
provide estimates so tha t  a range of possible judgmental probabilities is 
generated. 
Estimation of consequences. The consequences should be expressed in  
t e r m s  tha t  concern the  decision makers  (e.g., fatalities, injuries, finan- 
cial Iosses) ra ther  than in physical t e rms  (e.g., spill size, thermal  radia- 
tion). The possible consequences of domino effects (between an LEG te r -  
minal and nearby chemical plants, for example) should also be con- 
sidered. Whenever possible, consequerices should be estimated using 
data  from experiments, r a ther  than theoretical, unverified physical 
models. 
Identification of system parts that present the m a x i m u m  risk. For con- 
sidering mitigating measures  and engineering design i t  can be very help- 
ful to  identify the  par ts  of the  system t h a t  present  the  greates t  risk. 
S n s i t i w i t y  ana ly s i s .  Any risk assessment report should perform sensi- 
tivity analysis, particularly on the judgmental probabilities used, to show 
the possible range of uncertainty of the risk estimate. 
Assumpt ions .  The assumptions on which the analysis is based should be 
made clear. In addition, wherever possible, the implications of each 
assumption should be presented, to aid comparisons of assessments. 
Aisk-benef i t  ana ly s i s .  Although the estimation of the risk itself 
increases the understanding of the implications of certain decisions, we 
feel tha t  the estimation of the risks and benefits of alternatives in the 
context of LEG terminal decision problems would be more appropriate 
and useful to the decision makers. 
Acceptable r i sk  l e ve l .  There is no scientific way to decide if a certain risk 
level is acceptable t o  society or not. Risk assessment reports should 
therefore avoid making statements on this question. 
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